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Abstract 
Critical infrastructure networks such as electric power, water distribution, 
natural gas, transportation, and telecommunications, among others, are the backbone of 
modern societies as they provide them with the fundamental services that support the 
economic productivity, security, and quality of life of citizens. However, these 
infrastructure networks are not isolated from each other but instead, most of them rely 
on one another for their proper functioning, i.e., they are interconnected and mutually 
interdependent. Hence, they are highly vulnerable to any disruptive event (e.g., random 
failures, malevolent attacks, or natural disasters), where the occurrence of a disruption 
in one infrastructure network could affect other dependent infrastructure networks 
leading to a more significant adverse impact on societies. Moreover, the proliferation of 
interdependencies among infrastructure networks has increased the complexity 
associated with recovery planning after a disruptive event, which becomes a more 
challenging task for decision makers.  
Recognizing the inevitability of large-scale disruptions and their impacts to 
societies, the research objective of this work is to study the recovery of systems of 
interdependent infrastructure networks following a disruptive event. Accordingly, the 
purpose of the research components, i.e., main contribution, is to develop: (i) 
importance measures, and (ii) restoration modeling approaches, that enhance the 
resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure networks considering the 
physical interdependency among the infrastructure networks. 
The first research component is measuring the importance of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks components. Hence, the first contribution in this dissertation is 
xvi 
developing measures of importance or criticality of components of a system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks that determine which components adversely 
affect the resilience of the entire system of interdependent infrastructure networks when 
disrupted; and prioritize their restoration tasks accordingly. The goal of the proposed 
importance measures is to identify the critical network components that influence not 
only (i) the performance of their networks the most when disrupted and restored, but 
also (ii) the performance of other networks due to their interdependent nature. The 
proposed importance measures are illustrated through generated interdependent power-
water networks. The proposed importance measures represent a useful tool that can help 
decision makers to identify critical components in their networks following a disruptive 
event and prioritize their resolution accordingly.  
The second research component is optimizing the restoration of interdependent 
infrastructure networks. Hence, the second contribution in this dissertation is 
developing restoration modeling approaches using mixed-integer programming with the 
objective of maximizing the resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure 
networks while minimizing the total cost associated with the restoration process 
considering the availability of limited time and resources. The proposed modeling 
approaches aim to: (i) identify the set of disrupted components to be restored according 
to their influence on the resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure 
networks, and (ii) assign and schedule the restoration tasks to the available work crews. 
The proposed modeling approaches are illustrated through generated interdependent 
power-water networks with multiple disruptions scenarios as well as a system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks after multiple hypothetical earthquakes in 
xvii 
Shelby County, TN, United States. The proposed modeling approaches represent a 
useful tool for decision makers that can help them finding the optimal restoration 
strategy for their networks following a disruptive event. 
Moreover, we extend our two research components to address the restoration 
problem of community structures in a system of interdependent infrastructure networks 
following a disruptive event to enhance their resilience considering the 
interdependencies among the infrastructure networks. Accordingly, the third 
contribution in this dissertation if proposing a restoration model, using mixed-integer 
programming, to restore community structures of interdependent infrastructure 
networks with the objective of maximizing the resilience of the system interdependent 
infrastructure networks. Furthermore, we propose and discuss some community 
structures importance measures to priorities their restoration process. The proposed 
community structures importance measures are categorized into two groups: (i) prior to 
disruption importance measures, and (ii) post disruption importance measures. The 
proposed restoration model and importance measures for community structures in a 
system of interdependent infrastructure networks are illustrated through generated 
interdependent power-water networks. 
Finally, though the work in this dissertation discusses systems of interdependent 
infrastructure networks, the developed importance measures and restoration modelling 
approaches in this dissertation could be applied to any set of physically interdependent 
networks.     
  
1 
Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
A critical infrastructure network is defined as a network of independent, mostly 
privately-owned, man-made systems and processes that function collaboratively and 
synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of essential goods and 
services [The Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 1997]. Hence, critical infrastructure networks such as electric power, water 
distribution, natural gas, transportation and telecommunications, among others, are the 
backbone of modern societies, which depend on their continuous and proper 
functioning. Such critical infrastructure networks provide the fundamental services that 
support the economic productivity, security, and quality of life of citizens.  
However, infrastructure networks are subjected to be affected by different types 
of disruptive events, including random failures, malevolent attacks, and natural 
disasters, that could affect their performance differently due to their uncertainty and 
have direct consequences on communities and people’s daily lives. Hence, for several 
years, the United States, as well as many countries around the globe, have been 
interested in effectively preparing for and responding in a timely manner to such 
disruptive events (e.g., “secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructures” [White 
House 2013]). Therefore, it is increasingly important to not only protect current 
infrastructure networks against disruption, but to be able to restore them once they have 
been disrupted. 
The study of critical infrastructure networks under disruption has matured 
considerably in the past fifteen years, where emphasis has been given to identifying 
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descriptors that enable the study of critical network components that lead to network 
vulnerability. Such descriptors include topological-based descriptors such as average 
path length [Newman 2003], network efficiency [Nagurney and Qiang 2009], 
resilience-based descriptors such as resilience worth [Barker et al. 2013] and resilience 
[Whitson and Ramirez-Marqez 2009]), flow-based descriptors such as flow 
vulnerability [Ouyang et al. 2014] and flow capacity rate [Nicholson et al. 2016]), 
reliability-based descriptors such as reliability achievement worth [Ramirez-Marquez 
and Coit 2005] and availability [Barabady and Kumar 2007], other descriptors such as 
travel time and distance [Erath et al. 2009, Rodríguez-Núñez and García-Palomares 
2014], cost of travel time [Jenelius et al. 2006, Sullivan et al. 2010], and accessibility 
[Sohn 2006, Chen et al. 2007], among others.  
On the other hand, other studies provide methods and algorithms for restoring 
critical infrastructure networks following the occurrence of a disruptive event by: (i) 
determining the set of disrupted network components that need to be restored to 
maximize the performance of the network, (ii) assigning these components to work 
crews, (iii) determining the restoration sequence of these components, or (iv) an 
integrated approach [e.g., Xu et al. 2007, Yan and Shih 2009, Matisziw et al. 2010, 
Nurre  et al. 2012, Aksu and Ozdamar 2014, Vugrin et al. 2014, Kamamura et al. 2015, 
Fang et al. 2016, Hu et al. 2016, Fang and Sansavini 2017, Fu et al. 2017]. 
However, infrastructure networks are not isolated from each other, but rather 
they rely on one another in different ways for their proper functioning. Hence, they 
exhibit interdependency, where two infrastructure networks are said to be 
interdependent if there is a bidirectional relationship between them through which the 
3 
state of each infrastructure is dependent on the state of the other [Rinaldi et al. 2001, 
Peerenboom et al. 2002].  
In general, interdependencies across critical infrastructure networks can improve 
their operational efficiency since they lead to greater centralization of control, hence 
they play a significant role in the continuous, reliable operation of infrastructure 
network [Rinaldi et al. 2001]. However, the proliferation of interdependencies among 
infrastructure networks may potentially cause them to be highly vulnerable to 
disruption. Consequently, if the operability of an infrastructure network is affected by 
the occurrence of a disruptive event, this could lead to cascading inoperability in some 
or all dependent infrastructure networks due to their interdependencies; hence, a much 
more significant impact on society and its economy [Little 2002, Wallace et al. 2003, 
Buldyrev et al. 2010, Eusgeld et al. 2011, Wang et al. 2013, Ouyang 2014, Loggins and 
Wallace 2015, Danziger et al. 2016, Wu et al. 2016, Ouyang 2016]. The high 
vulnerability of the infrastructure networks, due to their increased interdependencies, 
has been shown through several recent worldwide events, including the 1998 Canada 
ice storm [Chang et al. 2007], the 2001 US World Trade Center attack [Mendonça and 
Wallace 2006], the 2003 North American blackout [U.S.-Canada Power System Outage 
Task Force 2004], and the 2010 Chile earthquake and tsunami [Wen et al. 2011], among 
others. Therefore, it is crucial for decision makers to account for interdependencies 
between infrastructure networks when preparing the plans for their recoverability to 
obtain a realistic analysis of their performance [Holden et al. 2013]. In addition, 
performing restoration activities for each infrastructure network independently could 
lead to improper utilization of available resources, wasted time, and may even cause 
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further disruptions when improperly scheduled [Baidya and Sun 2017]. As a result, the 
restoration of such interdependent infrastructure networks following a disruptive event 
has become more challenging for decision makers as the increase in interdependency 
among infrastructure networks magnifies the complexity associated with planning for 
their post-disruption recovery and operation. 
Several models and techniques that consider interdependencies among 
infrastructure networks are proposed in the literature. Rinaldi [2004] categorized such 
models and techniques into six broad categories: (i) aggregate supply and demand tools 
[e.g., Lee et al. 2007, Min et al. 2007], (ii) dynamic simulations [e.g., Hernandez-
Fajardo and Dueñas-Osorio 2013,  Zhang et al. 2016], (iii) agent-based models [e.g., 
Panzieri et al. 2004, Oliva et al. 2010], (iv) physics-based models [e.g., An et al. 2003, 
Unsihuay et al. 2007], (v) population mobility models [e.g., Casalicchio et al. 2009], 
and (vi) Leontief input-output models [e.g., Haimes and Jiang 2001, Reed et al. 2009]. 
The models and techniques proposed in this dissertation fall in the aggregate supply and 
demand tools category by Rinaldi [2004], which evaluates the total demands, in the 
form of services or commodities, for an infrastructure network in a region and the 
ability to supply them. In addition, it is classified as a network-based approach 
according to a similar categorization by Ouyang [2014] for the approaches of modeling 
and simulation in infrastructure networks considering their interdependencies. The 
network-based approach [Ouyang 2014] describes the infrastructures as networks of 
nodes, links, and inter-links (i.e., nodes represent the different components of the 
infrastructures, links represent the physical relationship between the nodes, and inter-
links represent the interdependencies among different infrastructures). 
5 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The ubiquitous nature of critical infrastructure networks has made them highly 
vulnerable due to the different types of interdependencies among them. Moreover, the 
proliferation of interdependencies among infrastructure networks has increased the 
complexity associated with recovery planning after a disruptive event, which becomes a 
more challenging task for decision makers. 
Recognizing the inevitability of large-scale disruptions, emphasis shifted from 
reliability-driven perspective of protection to a perspective of resilience, or the ability to 
withstand, adapt to, and recover in a timely manner from the effects of a disruptive 
event [Turnquist and Vugrin 2013]. Hence, US federal planning documents suggest (as 
do many across the globe) the importance of addressing critical infrastructure network 
resilience in such a way that reflects their “interconnectedness and interdependency” 
[White House 2013]. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan [DHS 2013] 
highlights the importance of addressing the risks associated with the interdependencies 
among different infrastructure networks as being “essential to enhancing critical 
infrastructure security and resilience”. That is, the study of the recoverability of 
infrastructure systems or the importance of their components should account for their 
interdependent nature. For example, an electric power substation may be more 
important when its influence on not only the rest of the electric power network is 
considered, but also when its influence on other infrastructures, such as water 
distribution or telecommunications, are included. Hence, it is important to have resilient 
infrastructure networks accounting for the interdependencies between them, thus the 
motivation of this dissertation. The Infrastructure Security Partnership [2011] defined 
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resilient infrastructure networks as the infrastructure networks that would “prepare for, 
prevent, protect against, respond or mitigate any anticipated or unexpected significant 
threat or event” and “rapidly recover and reconstitute critical assets, operations, and 
services with minimum damage and disruption”. 
Hence, the research objective of the work in this dissertation is to study the 
recovery of systems of interdependent infrastructure networks following a disruptive 
event. Accordingly, we develop: (i) importance measures, and (ii) restoration modeling 
approaches, that enhance the resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure 
networks considering the physical interdependency among the infrastructure networks. 
First, we develop two components importance measures (CIMs), namely 
Optimal Recovery Time (ORT) and Resilience Reduction Worth (ЯRW). The two 
proposed CIMs determine which components adversely affect the resilience of the 
entire system of interdependent infrastructure networks when disrupted; and prioritize 
their restoration tasks accordingly. Hence, the goal of the proposed CIMs is to identify 
the critical network components that influence not only (i) the performance of their 
networks the most when disrupted and restored, but also (ii) the performance of other 
networks due to their interdependent nature. The proposed CIMs prioritize disrupted 
components of a system of interdependent infrastructure networks based on multiple 
interdependent networks resilience optimization models using mixed-integer 
programming (MIP) with the objective of enhancing their resilience considering the 
interdependences among the infrastructure networks. The purpose of the proposed 
CIMs, i.e., ORT and ЯRW, is to (i) quantify the effect of the disrupted components on 
the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks once they are recovered, and 
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(ii) measure the potential impact on the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks caused by a specific disrupted network component, respectively.  
Second, we study the interdependent network restoration problem (INRP), 
which seeks to find the minimum-cost restoration strategy of a system of interdependent 
networks following the occurrence of a disruptive event that enhances its resilience 
considering the availability of time and resources. Accordingly, we propose restoration 
optimization models using MIP to solve this problem and suggest some solution 
approaches for large scale disruptions. In particular, the proposed models: (i) prioritize 
the restoration of the disrupted components for each infrastructure network, and (ii) 
assign and schedule the prioritized networks components to the available work crews, 
such that the resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure networks is 
enhanced considering the physical interdependency among them. The proposed 
optimization models for solving the INRP consider partial and complete: (i) disruptions 
for the disrupted network components, (ii) recovery of the disrupted network 
components, and (iii) dependence between nodes in different networks. Furthermore, 
four different recovery strategies considering different assumptions regarding work 
crews assignment and recovery process have been explored. These strategies include: (i) 
recovery acceleration (i.e., assigning more than one work crew to restore the same 
disrupted component at the same time), (ii) network component functionality (i.e., 
recovering a disrupted component partially), (iii) recovery tasks assignment (i.e., 
assigning the same work crew to recover a disrupted component at any time), and (iv) 
recovery process (i.e., considering a preemptive or non-preemptive recovery process). 
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Third, we address the restoration problem of community structures in a system 
of interdependent infrastructure networks following a disruptive event to enhance their 
resilience considering the interdependencies among the infrastructure networks. We 
extend our proposed restoration model, using MIP, to restore community structures of 
interdependent infrastructure networks with the objective of maximizing the resilience 
of the system interdependent infrastructure networks. Furthermore, we propose some 
community structures importance measures (CSIMs) to priorities their restoration 
process. The proposed CSIM are categorized into two groups: (i) prior to disruption 
CSIMs, and (ii) post disruption CSIMs.  
Finally, though the work in this dissertation discusses systems of interdependent 
infrastructure networks, the developed importance measures and restoration modelling 
approaches in this dissertation could be applied to any set of physically interdependent 
networks. Moreover, by studying the resilience of systems of interdependent 
infrastructure networks in this dissertation, we unveil the effects on their performance 
of both the magnitude of the disruptive event (i.e., network vulnerability) and the 
trajectory of recovery of their disrupted components (i.e., network recoverability). 
1.3 Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters where the content of each chapter is 
briefly described in this section. 
In Chapter 1, we give an overview about the studies of critical infrastructure 
networks under disruptions and introduce the interdependencies among infrastructure 
networks. In addition, we address the problem statement with the objective of this 
dissertation as well as the main contributions.  
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In Chapter 2, we present some backgrounds about network definition, resilience 
modeling, mathematical programming, and infrastructure networks interdependencies. 
Also, we discuss the previous studies in which similar kind of research is done. 
In Chapter 3, we present two component importance measures for systems of 
interdependent infrastructure networks based on four different developed resilience 
optimization models using MIP. Additionally, we present and discuss the results of a 
numerical experiment. Moreover, we discuss the effects of uncertainty on the proposed 
measures and also compare them with other two non-resilience-based measures.  
In Chapter 4, we present a restoration model for systems of interdependent 
infrastructure networks using MIP. Also, we present and discuss the results of a 
numerical experiment. Furthermore, we present a progressive restoration approach for 
large scale networks disruption. 
In Chapter 5, we present another restoration model for systems of 
interdependent infrastructure networks using MIP. In addition, we explore some 
recovery strategies for optimal interdependent infrastructure network resilience. Also, 
we present and discuss the results of a numerical experiment. 
In Chapter 6, we address the restoration problem of community structure in 
systems of interdependent infrastructure networks. We present a community structures 
restoration model using MIP. Furthermore, we present multiple importance measures 
for community structures. Also, we present and discuss the results of a numerical 
experiment. 
In Chapter 7, we summarize the contributions of the work in this dissertation 
and present some recommendations for future work and possible extensions. 
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Chapter 2 : Background and Related Work 
2.1 Background 
In this section, we discuss network definition, network resilience modelling, 
mathematical programming, and the different types of infrastructure networks 
interdependencies.  
2.1.1 Network Definition 
In this work, we consider networks that are classified as undirected graphs. Each 
network is denoted by = ( , ) where  is a set of  nodes and ⊂ {( , ): , ∈
, ≠ } is a set of undirected links with a limited capacity on each link. The flow and 
capacity on link ( , ) ∈  are denoted by  and , respectively. Each network has 
one or multiple supply nodes as well as one or multiple demand nodes, where supply 
and demand nodes are connected by finite directed paths. Let nodes  and  represent 
source and demand nodes, respectively. Nodes  and  are connected by a finite directed 
path, , through a set of internal nodes in  and one or more links in . The maximum 
capacity of a path equals the minimum capacity of all the links within that path (i.e., 
( , )∈ ) [Ford and Fulkerson 1956].  
The objective of the −  max flow problem is to find the maximum flow from 
node  to node  by utilizing a subset of all possible paths between them accounting for 
links capacity. Hence, the problem can be formulated as a linear programing (LP) model 
[Bazaraa et al. 2011], as shown in Eqs. (2-1) – (2-3). The objective of the model, Eq.(2-1), 
is to maximize the flow from node  to node , , for any source and demand node pair 
such that where , ∈  where ≠ , otherwise = 0 if = . Eq. (2-2) represents 
the flow conservation constraints, which ensure that the flow into and out of internal 
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nodes are equal and the flow out of node  and into node  equal the maximum flow 
between them, . The capacity constraints in Eq. (2-3) ensure that there is no negative 
flow as well as flow through any link does not exceed its capacity. We solve the −  
max flow problem using the push–relabel maximum flow algorithm [Goldberg and Tarjan 
1988] for a more CPU efficient solution.  




           if =                  
0               if ∈ \{ , }     
−         if =                 ( , )∈
 (2-2) 
0 ≤ ≤ ,      , ∈  (2-3) 
In this dissertation, we consider infrastructure networks with multiple source 
and demand nodes, which represent reality in many infrastructure networks (e.g., 
electric power networks) [Rocco et al. 2018]. The multiple source, multiple demand 
network can be reduced to a single source, single demand network by using the Ford-
Fulkerson [1962] algorithm as follows:  
(i) Add a new source node ∗ (i.e., super-source), and connect it to all source nodes by 
adding a link ( ∗, ) from ∗ to every source node . 
(ii) Add a new demand node ∗ (i.e., super-demand), and connect it to all demand nodes 
by adding a link ( , ∗) from every node  to ∗. 
(iii) Assign a capacity to each link ( ∗, ) equal to the capacity of node  
(iv) Assign a capacity to each link ( , ∗) equal to the demand of node . 
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The maximum flow from the super-source node, ∗, to the super-demand node, ∗, 
represents the total flow that can be supplied from the source nodes to the demand 
nodes within the network.  
2.1.2 Resilience Modeling 
Resilience is generally defined as the ability of an entity or system to withstand, 
adapt to, and recover from a disruptive event to a desired level of performance in a 
timely manner [Barker et al. 2017]. Resilience has been quantified by several different 
approaches that exist in the literature [Hosseini et al. 2016], including: the normalized 
shaded area underneath the performance function curve of a system [Cimellaro et al. 
2010], topological measures [Rosenkrantz et al. 2009], the ratio of the probability of 
failure and recovery [Li and Lence 2007], the ratio of the expected degradation and the 
maximum possible degradation in the performance of the system due to a disruption 
[Rose 2007], the loss of the system caused by a disruption [Bruneau et al. 2003], among 
others. In this work, we consider the paradigm proposed by Henry and Ramirez-
Marquez [2012] to describe and quantify the resilience of a system or a network based 
on its performance, as shown in Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2, which is considered by 
several papers in the literature [e.g., Ramirez-Marquez et al. 2018, Baroud et al. 2015, 
Pant et al. 2014, Baroud et al. 2014, Barker et al. 2013].  
Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 show three transition states with regards to the 
operation within a network: (i) the original state, , which is the state of the network 
from time  until the occurrence of a disruptive event,  at time , (ii) the disrupted 
state, , which is the state resulted following the maximum disruption that occurred 
during the period ( , ) and will last until the recovery process starts at time , and 
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(iii) the recovered state, , which is the state of the network upon the completion of the 
recovery process at time , which is not necessarily be same as  as it could be lower 
or higher than .  
 
Figure 2-1. Illustration of decreasing network performance, ( ), across different 




Figure 2-2. Illustration of increasing network performance, ( ), across different 
transition states over time (adapted from Ramirez-Marquez et al. [2017]) 
 
The performance of the network (e.g., flow, connectivity, unsatisfied customers, 
or delay) across these different states over time is measured by the function ( ), which 
describes the behavior of the network: (i) prior to the occurrence of a disruptive event, 
( ), (ii) after being disrupted, ( ), and (iii) after being recovered to a desired level, 
( ). Note that the performance of the system (network) following a disruptive event, 
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( ), could decrease as a result of the disruption (e.g., flow, connectivity, utilization of 
asset), as illustrated in Figure 2-1 [Henry and Ramirez-Marquez 2012], or increase (e.g., 
unsatisfied customers, delays in flow or service), as illustrated in Figure 2-2 [Ramirez-
Marquez et al. 2017], depending on how “performance” is measured. 
Henry and Ramirez-Marquez [2012] define network resilience, denoted by Я, as 
the time dependent ratio of the recovered performance of the network over the 
maximum loss in its performance following a disruptive event, , from a set  of 
possible disruptive events (i.e., Я( ) = Recovery( )/Loss( ), < ). Hence, Я( ) 
quantifies the resilience of the network at time , < < , as shown in Figure 2-1 
and Figure 2-2. Two primary dimensions of the system (network) resilience are 
illustrated in Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2: (i) vulnerability, or the magnitude of damage to 
a network caused by a disruptive event [Jönsson et al. 2008], and (ii) recoverability, or 
the speed at which a disrupted network recovers to a desired level of performance 
following the occurrence of a disruptive event [Rose 2007]. 
Hence, network resilience can be demonstrated when the performance of the 
network at , ( ), is affected by a disruptive event, , at time . Starting at this 
time, the network performance degrades until time . Then, the network will stay at the 
disrupted state , which has an associated performance level of ( ), until the 
restoration process commences at time . The restoration process continues until the 
network reaches the desired state , which has an associated performance level of 
( ). Thus, the resilience at time  (i.e., < < ), Я( ), for networks with 
decreasing performance when disrupted depicted in Figure 2-1, can be mathematically 
represented by Eq. (2-4), where | − |  represent the recovery of the 
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network performance at time , and ( ) − |  represent the loss (degradation) 
of the network performance up to time . 
Я | =
| − |
( ) − ( | )
, ∈ ( , ) (2-4) 
Similarly the resilience at a time  (i.e., < < ), Я( ), for networks with 
increasing performance when disrupted depicted in Figure 2-2, can be mathematically 
represented by Eq. (2-5), where | − |  represent the recovery of the 
network performance at time , and | − ( ) represent the loss (degradation) of 
the network performance up to time . 
Я | =
| − |
( | ) − ( )
, ∈ ( , ) (2-5) 
According to both Eqs. (2-4) and (2-5), the value of the network resilience, 
Я | , at time  given the occurrence of a disruptive event, , is between 0 and 1 
(i.e., Я | ∈ [0,1]), where Я | = 1 indicates the network is fully resilient.  
In this work, we consider the flow as the measure for the performance of 
networks. Hence, the performance of the networks in or study decreases following the 
occurrence of a disruptive event, as shown in Figure 2-1. That is, the maximum flow of 
an interdependent infrastructure network from its multiple supply nodes to its multiple 
demand nodes is considered to be the function by which the network performance is 
measured, and its resilience is determined, using Eq. (2-4).  
In this work, the maximum flow of an interdependent infrastructure network 
from its multiple supply nodes to its multiple demand nodes is considered to be the 
function by which the network performance is measured, and its resilience is 
determined. 
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2.1.3 Mathematical Programming 
Mathematical programming is a modeling approach used for decision-making 
problems. Formulations of mathematical programming include a set of decision 
variables, which represent the decisions that need to be found and an objective function, 
a function of the decision variables, which assesses the quality of the solution. A 
mathematical program will then either minimize or maximize the value of this objective 
function. 
The decisions of the model are subject to certain requirements and restrictions 
which can be included as a set of constraints in the model. Each constraint can be 
described as a function of the decision variables which bounds the feasible region of the 
solution and it is either equal to, not less than, or not more than, a certain value. Also, 
another type of constraint can simply restrict the set of values to which a variable might 
be assigned. 
Throughout this dissertation, we use Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) for 
constructing our models which is a subset of mathematical programming. We use MIP 
where the constraints and objective function are all linear with the restriction that some 
of the variables must be integer-valued. Several applications for MIP involve decisions 
that are discrete, while some other decisions are continuous in nature. In this thesis, we 
will refer to the form of MIP as the standard form which is described as: 
/        ( ) 
      subject to     ( ) ≤ 0 
                            ℎ ( ) = 0 
where: 
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             ( )   is the objective function to be minimized or maximized  
             ( )  are the inequality constraints to the problem for = 1,2,3, … ,     
             ℎ ( )  are the equality constraints to the problem for = 1,2,3, … ,   
 and  are the number of the constraints for the inequalities and the equalities, 
respectively [Murty 1995, Smith and Taşkin 2008, Murty 2010]. 
2.1.4 Infrastructure Networks Interdependencies 
There are multiple classifications for the interdependencies among infrastructure 
networks provided in the literature [e.g., Rinaldi et al. 2001, Zimmerman 2001, Wallace 
et al. 2003, Dudenhoeffer et al. 2006, Lee et al. 2007, Zhang and Peeta 2011]. Rinaldi et 
al. [2001] classified the interdependencies between infrastructure networks into four 
categories: (i) physical interdependency, an output from an infrastructure network is an 
input to another one and vice versa, (ii) cyber interdependency, if an infrastructure 
network depends on information transmitted through an information infrastructure, (iii) 
geographical interdependency, if two infrastructure networks are affected by the same 
local disruptive event, and (iv) logical interdependency, all other types of 
interdependencies. Figure 2-3 shows an example of the interdependencies between 
different infrastructure networks. In this chapter, we consider the physical 
interdependency among different critical infrastructure networks. This physical 
interdependence by Rinaldi et al. [2001] is equivalent to functional or input 
interdependency in other interdependence classifications. However, the work in this 
dissertation could be extended to consider other types of interdependencies such as 
geographical interdependency, which could be incorporated in this work by considering 
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Figure 2-3. An example of interdependences among different infrastructure 
networks (adapted from Rinaldi et al. [2001]) 
 
2.2 Related Work 
In this section, we present and discuss some previous studies in the literature 
that are related to the work in this dissertation, i.e., component importance measures 
and restoration models for interdependent infrastructure networks. 
2.2.1 Component Importance Measures 
Multiple component importance measures (CIMs) are proposed in the literature 
in which the interdependences between critical infrastructure networks are considered to 
identify their critical components. Dueñas‐Osorio et al. [2007] prioritized the restoration 
process for the nodes of interdependent infrastructure networks to reduce their fragility 
according to a proposed CIM, interdependent rank ordering (IRO), considering physical 
interdependency among the infrastructure networks. IRO accounts for multiple criteria 
for each node (i.e., network connectivity, flow traversal, flow transfer at the interface 
with other infrastructures, and network vulnerability), where each node has its own rank 
in each one of these criteria. The final prioritized list of nodes can be obtained by 
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considering the rank of the nodes in each criterion along with a weighting factor for 
each criterion. Patterson and Apostolakis [2007] developed a new approach, geographic 
valued worth (GVW), to rank geographical locations that can affect multiple 
infrastructure networks the most when disrupted considering the geographical 
interdependency between the infrastructure networks. First, the worth of each network 
component in each infrastructure network is calculated. Then, a generic grid is 
developed and laid across the map of the interdependent infrastructure networks in 
order to determine the geographical locations for the study. Finally, the GVW value is 
determined for each geographical location which consists of combined valued worth of 
the network components of all interdependent infrastructure networks within that 
location then rank the geographical locations accordingly. However, the rank of the 
geographical locations is dependent of their size. Johansson and Hassel [2010] proposed 
a CIM that identifies the critical components of interdependent infrastructure networks 
by quantifying the contribution of their synergistic consequences to the total synergistic 
consequences for a specific size of the failure set (e.g., single failures, two simultaneous 
failures, three simultaneous failures, and so on) taking into account the physical 
interdependency between the infrastructure networks. They also identified the critical 
locations within the interdependent infrastructure networks by evaluating the 
consequences on the interdependent infrastructure networks performance when 
components in close proximity to each other and could be from different infrastructure 
networks are removed considering physical and geographical interdependencies 
between infrastructure networks where two infrastructure networks are said to be 
geographically interdependent if they are affected by the same local disruption. Wang et 
20 
al. [2012] suggested a new approach to identify the critical components in an 
infrastructure network considering its physical interdependency with other 
infrastructure networks. They evaluated the importance of a network component 
through assessing the relative drop in the performance of the infrastructure network 
when this component is disrupted (i.e., not working). Hence, the global safety efficiency 
of the infrastructure network is obtained when each component is not working. 
Accordingly, the network components are ranked with respect to the proportion of 
degradation in the global safety efficiency of their network where the higher 
degradation indicates the most vulnerable network component. 
However, by recognizing the inevitability of large-scale disruptions, emphasis 
shifted from reliability-driven perspective of protection [Patterson and Apostolakis 
2007, Johansson and Hassel 2010, Wang et al. 2012] to a perspective of resilience, or 
the ability to withstand, adapt to, and recover in a timely manner from the effects of a 
disruptive event [Turnquist and Vugrin 2013]. Therefore, it is important to have 
resilient infrastructure networks accounting for the interdependencies between them. 
2.2.2 Restoration Models 
The literature has recently addressed the restoration problem of interdependent 
infrastructure networks. Accordingly, several approaches have been developed that 
could best be described with two groups: (i) infrastructure-specific approaches, which 
consider the physics of different infrastructures are considered (e.g., DC power flow 
model) and hence could be applied on these infrastructure networks only, and (ii) 
general approaches, which could be applied to any system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks. 
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As for the infrastructure-specific approaches for the interdependent network 
restoration, Coffrin et al. [2012] studied the problem of restoring two physically 
interdependent infrastructure networks, power and gas networks. They integrated two 
network-specific flow models (i.e., a linearized DC flow model for the power network 
and a maximum flow model for the gas network) using MIP with the objective of 
maximizing the weighted sum of interdependent demand over the restoration time 
horizon and solved them using a randomized adaptive decomposition approach. The 
proposed models aim to find: (i) the set of disrupted components to be restored, and (ii) 
the restoration order of the selected disrupted components. However, the proposed 
model did not consider different restoration durations for the disrupted networks 
components in addition for being developed for specific types of infrastructure 
networks. Baidya and Sun [2017] provided an optimization-based restoration strategy 
that aims to prioritize the restoration activities between two physically interdependent 
infrastructure networks, power system and communication networks, considering their 
physics-based properties. The proposed approach is formulated using MIP with the 
objective of activating every node in both networks with the minimum number of 
activation/energization of branches. Tootaghaj et al. [2017] focused on the cascading 
disruptions impact on the physically interdependent power grid and communication 
network considering disruptions in power networks only. Accordingly, they proposed a 
two-phase recovery approach: (i) avoid further cascade, for which they formulate the 
minimum cost flow assignment problem using linear programming (LP) with the 
objective of finding a DC power flow setting that stops the cascading failure at 
minimum cost, and (ii) provide a recovery schedule, for which they formulate the 
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recovery problem using MIP with the objective of maximizing the total amount of 
delivered power over the recovery horizon and solve it using two heuristic approaches: 
a shadow-pricing heuristic and a backward algorithm. 
Regarding the general approaches for setting up the restoration of 
interdependent infrastructure networks, Lee et al. [2007] proposed an interdependent 
layer network model using MIP that accounts for different interdependencies among the 
infrastructure networks. The objective of the model is to minimize the flow costs along 
with the slack costs but not including the cost associated with the restoration process of 
the disrupted components. Moreover, it focuses only on determining the set of disrupted 
components (i.e., links) of the interdependent infrastructure networks that need to be 
recovered to restore the performance of each of the infrastructure networks to the 
functionality level prior to the occurrence of a disruptive event. Hence, the proposed 
model does not specify the time at which they need to be restored (i.e., the prioritizing 
of the restoration process for the disrupted components) or which work crew is assigned 
to restore which disrupted component. In addition, the model assumes binary status of 
network components (i.e., disrupted or not disrupted). On the other hand, Gong et al. 
[2009] focused only on the scheduling problem of a predetermined set of disrupted 
components for interdependent infrastructure networks with predefined due dates for 
them. They provided a multi-objective restoration planning model, using MIP, to find 
the optimal restoration schedule for disrupted components and solved it using a logic-
based benders decomposition approach. The objective of the model is to minimize the 
weighted sum of the cost, tardiness, and makespan that are associated with the 
restoration process of the disrupted components. Cavdaroglu et al. [2013] and Sharkey 
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et al. [2015] integrated the two approaches by Lee et al. [2007] and Gong et al. [2009] 
by providing a MIP model that integrates: (i) determining the set of disrupted 
components (i.e., links) to be restored, along with (ii) assigning and scheduling them to 
work crews, and solved it using a suggested heuristic solution method. The objective of 
this model is to minimize the total cost of flow cost, unsatisfied demand, and 
installation and assignment that is associated with the full restoration of a set of 
infrastructure networks accounting for the interdependencies among them. However, 
they assumed binary status of network components (i.e., disrupted or not disrupted) 
which could be restored with a non-preemptive recovery process. Holden et al. [2013] 
proposed an extended network-flow approach to simulate the performance of a set of 
infrastructure networks at a local scale (i.e., community scale) considering the physical 
interdependency among them. Hence, they provided an optimization model using LP 
that aims to find the optimal performance of the infrastructure networks such that the 
total cost associated with production, storage, commodity flow, discharge, and shortage 
(i.e., unsatisfied demand) is minimized. However, the proposed approach does not 
explicitly discuss what are the set of disrupted networks components, their restoration 
durations, and their restoration priorities. Also, the approach does not consider the 
availability of the work crews; hence determine their restoration schedule. Di Muro et 
al. [2016] studied the recovery problem of the system of physically interdependent 
infrastructure networks in the presence of cascading failures to mitigate its breakdown. 
They considered restoring the disrupted network components (i.e., nodes) that are 
located at the boundary of the largest connected component (i.e., functional network) 
and reconnect them to it considering the probability of recovery that halts the cascade 
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for interdependent infrastructure networks. They developed a stochastic model for the 
competition between the cascading failures and the restoration strategy for the disrupted 
components and solved it theoretically using random node percolation theory. However, 
they considered a random recovery strategy for the disrupted nodes. In addition, they 
have not considered the availability of work crews. González et al. [2016] studied the 
interdependent network design problem considering their physical and geographical 
interdependencies. They formulated an MIP model to determine: (i) the set of disrupted 
components to be restored, and (ii) the order of their restoration, with the objective of 
minimizing the overall cost associated with preparing geographical locations, 
restoration of disrupted components, unbalance from disconnection, and flow. 
However, the model does not specify which work crews should restore particular 
disrupted components. Moreover, they assumed binary status of network components 
(i.e., disrupted or not disrupted). Zhang et al. [2018] provided an optimization model 
that determines the optimal allocation of restoration resources for a set infrastructure 
networks that are physically interdependent such that its resilience is enhanced. The 
proposed model aims to: (i) allocate limited resources to interdependent infrastructure 
networks, and (ii) determine the optimal budget for restoration following a specific 
disruptive event, solved using a genetic algorithm approach. However, their work 
focuses only on the allocation of restoration resources (i.e., budget) for a set of 
infrastructure networks following a disruptive event.  
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Chapter 3 : Component Importance Measures for Interdependent 
Network Resilience  
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we propose two resilience-based CIMs that (i) quantify the effect 
of the disrupted components on the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks once they are recovered, and (ii) measure the potential impact on the 
resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks caused by a specific disrupted 
network element, respectively. Hence, they provide a set of prioritized restoration tasks 
for the disrupted components (nodes and links) in the interdependent infrastructure 
networks aiming to enhance their resilience taking into account their physical 
interdependency. The two proposed CIMs are based on multiple interdependent 
infrastructure networks resilience optimization models using MIP and considering 
complete or proportional disruptions for disrupted network components with a fixed or 
variable recovery durations for each one of them.  
3.2 Resilience Optimization Models 
In this section, we propose four different resilience optimization models for 
interdependent infrastructure networks using MIP considering the disruption status for 
the disrupted network components as well as their recovery durations. The objective of 
the proposed resilience optimization models is to maximize the resilience of the system 
of interdependent infrastructure networks considering the physical interdependency 
among them. The four proposed resilience optimization models have different 
considerations regarding disruption status and recovery duration of the disrupted 
network component, see Table 3-1.  
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Table 3-1. Different considerations for resilience optimization models 
 
Model 
Disruption Recovery duration 
Partial Full Fixed Different 
Model I  √ √  
Model II √  √  
Model III  √  √ 
Model IV √   √ 
 
3.2.1 Assumptions 
There are several assumptions for the proposed optimization models: 
 Each infrastructure network consists of a set of components (used generally to refer 
to nodes and/or links) that are subjected to disruptions. 
 Disrupted network components could be either: (i) completely disrupted with a 
binary status for each network component following a disruptive event (i.e., 0 if 
completely disrupted and 1 if undisrupted), or (ii) partially disrupted, where a 
disrupted component is not completely disrupted but instead functioning partially. 
 Each disrupted component in each infrastructure network can be restored. 
 Recovery durations for disrupted network components are either: (i) fixed, where all 
disrupted components are assumed to have the same recovery duration (i.e., of one 
time unit for each disrupted component), or (ii) varying, where recovery durations 
are not fixed for all disrupted components. 
 Partially disrupted network components, with different recovery durations, could be 
recovered faster than completely disrupted network components due to their status 
(size) of disruption (i.e., the recovery durations for partially disrupted network 
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components is proportional of the recovery durations of the completely disrupted 
network components). 
 Each supply node, demand node, and link in each infrastructure network has a 
known supply capacity, demand, and flow capacity, respectively. 
 The physical interdependence among different infrastructure networks is 
considered. That is, for a dependent node in an infrastructure network to be 
operational, it requires a specific node from another infrastructure network to also 
be operational. 
 The models, in which partial disruptions are considered, allow for partial 
interdependencies considering the partial status of disruption (i.e., partial 
functioning of dependent nodes). That is, a node could be functioning partially if the 
other node upon which it depends is also functioning partially. 
3.2.2 Notation 
The sets, parameters, and decision variables of the proposed resilience 
optimization models are shown in Table 3-2, Table 3-3, and Table 3-4, respectively. 
Table 3-2. Sets of the proposed resilience optimization models 
 
 Time periods in the restoration horizon, = {1, … , } 
 Interdependent infrastructure networks,  
 Nodes in network ∈  
 Links in network ∈  
 Supply nodes in network ∈ , ⊆  
 Demand nodes in network ∈ , ⊆  
 Disrupted nodes in network ∈ , ⊆  
 Disrupted links in network ∈ , ⊆  
 
Interdependent nodes (i.e., ( , ), ,̅ ∈ Ψ indicates that 
node ̅ ∈  in network ∈  requires node ∈  in 
network ∈  to be operational) 
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Table 3-3. Parameters of the proposed resilience optimization models 
 
for network k ∈ K 
 
 Capacity of link ( , ) ∈  
 Weight, ∑ = 1∈  
 
Total maximum flow from all supply nodes to all demand 
nodes prior to the disruption 
 
Total maximum flow from all supply nodes to all demand 
nodes after the disruption 
 Restoration duration of node ∈   
 Restoration duration of link ( , ) ∈   
 Restoration duration of partially disrupted node ∈   
 Restoration duration of partially disrupted link ( , ) ∈   
 Size of partial disruption in node ∈  
 Size of partial disruption in link ( , ) ∈  
  
Table 3-4. Decision variables of the proposed resilience optimization models 
 
for network k ∈ K at time t ∈ T 
 
 
Amount of supply and demand at node ∈  and node 
∈ , respectively 
 Amount of flow through link ( , ) ∈  
 
A binary variable that equals 1 if node ∈  is 
operational; and 0 otherwise 
 A binary variable that equals 1 if link ( , ) ∈  is 
operational; and 0 otherwise 
 A binary variable that equals 1 if node ∈  is restored; 
and 0 otherwise 
 A binary variable that equals 1 if link ( , ) ∈  is 
restored; and 0 otherwise 
 
3.2.3 Objective 
The amount of flow supplied from node ∈  in network ∈ , , is 
considered in the proposed resilience optimization model to be the maximum flow from 
supply node ∈  to all demand nodes in network ∈  after recovery at time period 
∈ . As such,  is obtained by solving the maximum flow problem described earlier 
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(i.e., Eqs. (2-1) – (2-3)). Hence, the total maximum flow supplied from all supply nodes 
and received by all demand nodes in network ∈  after recovery at time period ∈  
equals ∑ ∈ . Moreover,  refers to the original maximum flow at time , and   
refers to the maximum flow at time  following a disruptive event, , see Figure 2-1.  
Accordingly, the resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure 
networks, denoted by Я , can be represented mathematically by Eq. (3-1). Hence, 
∑ ∑ ∈ − ∑ ( )∈  represents the recovery of network ∈  over the 
restoration time horizon, where ∑ ∈  equals to , while the total loss in network 
∈  is represented by ( − ). 
Я =




3.2.4 Model I 
The first resilience optimization model considers binary status of each network 
component following a disruptive event (i.e., 0 if completely disrupted and 1 if 
undisrupted). All disrupted components (nodes or links) are assumed to have the same 
recovery duration. In other words, this model assumes a fixed time duration for 
recovery of one-time unit for each disrupted component. Accordingly, Model I can be 
mathematically formulated with objective (3-2) and constraints  (3-3) – (3-18). 
















= − ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈   
(3-5) 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-6) 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-7) 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-8) 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-9) 
̅ − ≤ 0,     ∀ ( , ), ,̅ ∈ , ∈   (3-10) 
− ≤ 0, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈   (3-11) 
− ≤ 0, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈   (3-12) 




  ∀ ∈ , ∈  
(3-13) 
= 0, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈   (3-14) 
= 0, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-15) 
≥ 0, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈   (3-16) 
∈ {0,1}, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈   (3-17) 
∈ {0,1}, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈   (3-18) 
Objective (3-2) maximizes the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks over the recovery time horizon. Constraints (3-3) – (3-5) are flow 
conservation constraints at node ∈  in network ∈  at time ∈ . Constraints 
(3-6) – (3-9) are capacity constraints on link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  at time ∈  
considering undisrupted network components in (3-6), disrupted or non-operational 
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nodes in (3-7) and (3-8), and disrupted links in constraints (3-9). The physical 
interdependence between the networks is represented in (3-10), which ensure that node 
̅ ∈  in network ∈  cannot be operational at time ∈  unless node ∈  in 
network ∈  is operational at time ∈  as well. Constraints (3-11) and (3-12) ensure 
that once a link or node, respectively, in network ∈  is recovered or operational at 
time ∈ , it will remain operational thereafter. Constraints (3-13) ensure that at most 
one component (node or link) in network ∈  can be recovered during time ∈ . 
Constraints (3-14) and (3-15) reflect the initial status of the disrupted links and nodes, 
respectively, in network ∈ . Constraints (3-16) – (3-18) deal with the nature of the 
decision variables. 
3.2.5 Model II 
Though this second resilience optimization model is similar to Model I in 
assuming a fixed time duration for recovery of one time unit for each disrupted 
component, it considers proportional disruptions for the disrupted components, meaning 
that a disrupted node or link is not completely disrupted but instead functioning partially. 
Considering proportional disruption allows for partial functioning of dependent nodes. 
Hence, the Model II can be mathematically formulated as Model I but with constraints 
(3-7), (3-8), and (3-9) replaced by constraints (3-19), (3-20), and (3-21), respectively, to 
account for the proportional disruptions. 
− 1 − × + ≤ 0,    ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-19) 
− 1 − × + ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-20) 
− 1 − × + ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-21) 
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3.2.6 Model III 
The third resilience optimization model considers binary status of each network 
component following a disruptive event (i.e., 0 if completely damaged and 1 if 
unaffected). However, the recovery duration for disrupted nodes and links are different: 
the recovery duration is not fixed for all disrupted components. Accordingly, the Model 
III can be mathematically formulated by objective (3-2),  constraints (3-3) – (3-10) and 
(3-16) – (3-18), along with constraints (3-22) – (3-30). 
= 0,       ∀ ∈ , ∈  (3-22) 
= 0,       ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈  (3-23) 
= 0,       ∀ ∈ , ∈  (3-24) 
= 0,       ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈  (3-25) 
 { , }
+ ≤ 1,    ∀ ∈ , ∈
 { , }
( , )∈∈
 (3-26) 
≤ ,       ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-27) 
≤ ,       ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-28) 
∈ {0,1},     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-29) 
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∈ {0,1},     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (3-30) 
Constraints (3-22) and (3-23) ensure that no disrupted component (node or link) 
is operational prior to its required recovery time (i.e., node  and link ( , ) in network 
∈  cannot be operational prior to  and  time periods, respectively which are 
their required recovery durations). Similarly, constraints (3-24) and (3-25) ensure that 
no disrupted component (node or link) is recovered before its required recovery 
duration (i.e., node  and link ( , ) in network ∈  require  and  time periods, 
respectively for them to be recovered and be operational; hence they cannot be 
recovered prior to these times). Constraints (3-26) ensure that at most one component 
(node or link) is recovered at time ∈  (i.e., if  equals 1, it means that node  in 
network ∈  is recovered during the time period ( − + 1, ) and if  equals 1, it 
means that link ( , ) in network ∈  is recovered during the time period ( − +
1, )). Constraints (3-27) and (3-28) ensure that if a node or link, respectively is 
operational at time ∈ , it must also be recovered at that time. Constraints (3-29) and 
(3-30) are constraints on the nature of the decision variables. 
3.2.7 Model IV 
The fourth resilience optimization model considers proportional disruptions for 
the disrupted components, where a disrupted component is not completely disrupted but 
functioning partially, thus allowing for partial functioning of dependent nodes. Model 
IV also considers different recovery durations for disrupted nodes and links. However, 
they could be recovered faster than their required recovery duration, as they are 
proportionally disrupted. As such, let the time to recover the partial disruption in node  
∈  in network ∈  denoted by  (i.e., = × ). Likewise, let the time to 
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recover the proportional disruption in link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  denoted by  
(i.e., = × ). Model IV can be mathematically formulated as Model III with 
constraints (3-7), (3-8), and (3-9) replaced by constraints (3-19), (3-20), and (3-21), 
respectively, to account for the proportional disruptions and constraints (3-22) – (3-26) 
replaced by constraints (3-31) – (3-35), respectively, to account for the recovery of the 
proportional disruptions. Note that constraints (3-31) – (3-35) are similar to constraints 
(3-22) – (3-26)  but with the difference of the recovery duration of the disrupted 
networks components due to the consideration of a different disruption assumption (i.e., 
proportional disruptions). 
= 0,       ∀ ∈ , ∈  (3-31) 
= 0,       ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈  (3-32) 
= 0,       ∀ ∈ , ∈  (3-33) 
= 0,       ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈  (3-34) 
+ ≤ 1,    ∀ ∈ , ∈
 { , }
( , )∈
 { , }
∈
 (3-35) 
Similar to Model III but with the consideration of the proportional disruptions, 
constraints (3-31) and (3-32) ensure that no proportionally disrupted component (node 
or link) is operational prior to the required recovery duration for its proportional 
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disruption (i.e., node  and link ( , ) in network ∈  cannot be operational prior to  
and  time periods, respectively which are their required recovery time). Similarly, 
constraints (3-33) and (3-34) ensure that no partially disrupted component (node or link) 
is recovered before its required recovery duration (i.e., node  and link ( , ) in network 
∈  require  and  time periods, respectively for them to be recovered from their 
proportional disruption and be operational; hence they cannot be recovered prior to 
these times). Constraints (3-35) ensure that at most one component (node or link) is 
recovered at time ∈  (i.e., if  equals 1, it means that node  in network ∈  is 
recovered during the time period ( − + 1, ) and if  equals 1, it means that link 
( , ) in network ∈  is recovered during the time period ( − + 1, )). 
3.3 Component Importance Measures 
In this dissertation, we propose two resilience-based component importance 
measures (CIMs), namely Optimal Recovery Time (ORT) and Resilience Reduction 
Worth (ЯRW). These measures will prioritize the disrupted components, be they nodes 
and/or links, according to their criticality and importance based on their effect on the 
resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks. The two resilience-based CIM 
are defined as follows. 
3.3.1  Optimal Recovery Time 
The optimal recovery time CIM is defined as the optimal time to recover a 
disrupted network component (node or link) such that the resilience of the 
interdependent infrastructure networks is maximized over the recovery time horizon. It 
quantifies the effect of the disrupted components on the resilience of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks once they are recovered and prioritizes them accordingly where 
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the lower value of the ORT indicates the extent to which the component is more 
important to the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks. This CIM is 
similar to the importance measure proposed by Fang et al. [2016] but extended for 
interdependent infrastructure networks, as well as it is based on the multiple 
interdependent network resilience optimization formulations presented in Section 3. 
This CIM provides decision makers with the restoration priorities of only the disrupted 
networks components that have influence on the resilience of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks, which satisfy the objective of the multiple proposed models. As 
such, there could be some disrupted components that do not enhance the resilience of 
the interdependent infrastructure networks when restored; hence, their restoration 
priorities are left to the preferences of decision makers.  
Definition 3.3.2. (ORT).  The ORT of a disrupted network component ∈ = ∪
 in network ∈ , denoted as , is defined in Eq. (3-36), where  represents 
the status of each component at time period ∈  such that  equals 1 if component 
∈  in network ∈  is operational at time period ∈  and 0 otherwise. 
= 1 + (1 − ) (3-36) 
where: 
=
,           if  is a node, =        
, if  s a link, = ( , )  
  
3.3.2  Resilience Reduction Worth 
The resilience reduction worth CIM is defined as the ratio of the optimal system 
resilience at recovery time  to the optimal system resilience when a disrupted network 
component (node or link) is not recovered at recovery time . It measures the potential 
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impact on the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks caused by a 
specific disrupted network element (i.e., when this specific disrupted network element is 
not recovered during the recovery time horizon). The higher value of ЯRW indicates the 
more critical the component is to the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks. This CIM is inspired by the performance reduction worth importance 
measure [Levitin et al. 2003] and the reliability reduction worth importance measure 
[Espiritu et al. 2007], both of which are defined by the ratio of actual system 
performance to the system performance when a specific component is always 
considered to be failed or not working. 
Definition 3.3.2. (ЯRW). The ЯRW of a disrupted network component ∈ =
∪  in network ∈ , denoted as Я , is defined in Eq. (3-37), where Я( ) is 
the optimal resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks at time  and 
Я( | ∑ = 0∈ ) is the optimal resilience of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks at time  when network component ∈  is not recovered. 
Я =
Я ( )
Я ( | ∑ = 0∈ )
 (3-37) 
3.4 Numerical Experiment 
In this section, we illustrate our proposed resilience-based CIMs considering the 
multiple interdependent network resilience optimization models with some generated 
interdependent infrastructure networks. 
3.4.1 Networks Data 
Due to the difficulty of obtaining real data for interdependent infrastructure 
networks [Johansson and Hassel 2010, Bagchi et al. 2010], the proposed CIMs are 
illustrated with realistic fictional interdependent infrastructure networks. These fictional 
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interdependent infrastructure networks are generated using the extended algorithm for 
proximal topology generator proposed by Xin-Jian [2007] which was initially 
introduced by Casey [2005]. Hence, we generate the fictional interdependent 
infrastructure networks in two stages: (i) generating individual networks; and (ii) 
building the interdependencies across them [Zhang et al. 2016]. 
In this dissertation, we illustrate our restoration model considering two 
infrastructure networks, namely simulated power and water networks. For the power 
network, power generators and substations represent the supply and demand nodes, 
respectively and the lines between the nodes within this network represent the links. For 
the water network, water pumps and storage tanks represent the supply and demand 
nodes, respectively and the pipelines between the nodes within this network represent 
the links. These two networks are interdependent as the water network needs power for 
operation and the power network requires water for cooling and emission control 
[Dueñas-Osorio et al. 2007, Zhang et al. 2016].  
For the first phase of the generation process of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks, each network will initially be seeded with independent and randomly 
distributed source nodes (i.e., no links between them). At each time step, a new 
randomly distributed node is added to the network and connected to the nearest existing 
node based on Euclidean distance by adding a new undirected link between them. Then, 
a sparse random graph is added after the final time step to the generated network. 
In the dissertation, the physical dependence between the infrastructure networks 
is considered to describe their interdependence, that is the functionality of a node in one 
network is dependent on the functionality of a node in another network. Hence, the two 
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infrastructure networks considered in this illustrative example are interdependent as 
described earlier. Accordingly, we build the interdependencies between these two 
interdependent infrastructure networks, representing the second stage of the fictional 
interdependent infrastructure networks generation process. Hence, for the second phase 
of the generation process of the interdependent infrastructure networks, each water 
pump and storage tank in the water network will depend on the nearest power generator 
or substation in the power network (i.e., power generators or substation), based on 
Euclidean distance, for their functionality. Likewise, each power generator in the power 
network will depend on the nearest water pump in the water network, based on 
Euclidean distance, for its functionality. 
Figure 3-1 shows the generated two fictional interdependent infrastructure 
networks using the igraph library in the R platform. Furthermore, Table 3-5 depicts the 
general properties for the interdependent power and water networks, that includes 
number of nodes, number of undirected links, number of supply nodes, number of 
demand nodes, and average node degree, respectively.   
 
Figure 3-1. An example of interdependent infrastructure networks 
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Table 3-5. General properties of the interdependent infrastructure networks 
 
Network     〈 〉 
Power 9 15 3 3 3.33 
Water 9 12 3 3 2.67 
 
In this work, the two generated infrastructure networks, shown in Figure 3-1, are 
utilized to illustrate our proposed resilience-based CIMs which aim to enhance the 
resilience of the system for interdependent infrastructure network based on the 
maximum flow from its multiple supple nodes to its multiple demand nodes. However, 
the two generated infrastructure networks could also be utilized with other topologies 
(e.g., shortest paths) and considering other type of interdependencies among the 
infrastructure networks (e.g., geographical interdependence) that we are considering for 
a future work.   
3.4.2 Experimental Results 
In this work, we measure the efficiency of an infrastructure network as the ratio 
of the current maximum flow from all its multiple supply nodes to all its demand nodes 
over the original maximum flow prior to a disruption or network components removals. 
Figure 3-2 shows the drop in the efficiency of each of the two interdependent 
infrastructure networks associated with the fractional removal of some components 
(nodes and links) from both interdependent infrastructure networks. Hence, the effect of 
these removed network components is shown in both interdependent infrastructure 
networks due to their interdependencies. The drop in efficiency of each infrastructure 
network associated with the fractional removal of some components from each 
infrastructure network independently (i.e., without considering the interdependence 
between the two infrastructure networks) is also illustrated in Figure 3-2. Comparing 
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the effect of the removal of fraction of components from the two infrastructure 
networks on each individual one independently and interdependently, it can be 
concluded as expected that the efficiency of both infrastructure networks declines faster 
when considering the interdependencies between the two infrastructure networks rather 
than when the interdependencies between them are not considered, see Figure 3-2. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3-2. Efficiency with fractional removal of networks components for the (a) 
power network, and (b) water network 
 
The two interdependent infrastructure networks were disrupted randomly, 
targeting the same number and type of disrupted components in both network, 10 
network components in each network (i.e., 3 nodes and 7 links). The set of disrupted 
components in power and water networks are shown in Table 3-6 and Table 3-7, 
respectively. Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 show the importance of each disrupted 
component in power and water, respectively according to the two proposed CIM, ORT 
and ЯRW, considering the multiple interdependent network resilience optimization 
formulations discussed in Section 3.2 which are solved using LINGO 17.0. Without loss 
of generality, we consider the following parameter distributions and values for 
illustrative purposes: = 1/| |, ∼ (20,50), and , , , and ∼ (1,3).   
In Model IV, if the recovery duration of a partially disrupted network 
component is not integer, it is rounded up to the nearest integer number since we are 
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dealing with time periods. The disrupted components for both networks are considered 
completely disrupted in Model I and Model III whereas they are considered partially 
disrupted in Model II and Model IV with the same partial disruptions. 
According to the ORT importance measure, the disrupted components in the two 
networks have different ranks based on their importance and effect on the resilience of 
the interdependent infrastructure networks when based on different models, as shown in 
Table 3-6 and Table 3-7. For example, node 4 in the power network is the most 
important component with the highest restoration priority when considering complete 
disruption (based on Model I and Model III), and the most important component when 
considering proportional disruption (based on Model II and Model IV), as shown in 
Table 3-6. Similarly, link (3,8) in the water network is the most important component 
with the highest restoration priority based on Model I, while it is not the most important 
component when based on Model II, Model III, or Model IV, as shown in Table 3-7. 
Table 3-6. Restoration priorities for the disrupted components in Power network 























node 4 1 8 1 8  1 8 1 8 
node 5 4 5 4 5  2 3 2 3 
node 6 6 4 7 4  3 4 3 4 
link (1,8) 5 1 5 1  5 2 5 2 
link (2,4) 9 9 10 9  9 9 9 9 
link (3,9) 2 3 2 3  6 5 6 5 
link (4,7) 3 7 3 7  8 7 8 7 
link (5,6) 8 6 8 6  7 6 7 6 
link (6,8) 7 2 6 2  4 1 4 1 
link (8,9) 10 10 9 10  10 10 10 10 
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Table 3-7. Restoration priorities for the disrupted components in Water network 























node 4 7 6 6 5  5 4 5 4 
node 5 5 2 7 2  1 1 1 1 
node 6 2 9 1 8  2 8 2 8 
link (1,4) 10 8 10 9  10 9 10 9 
link (1,9) 4 5 4 4  4 7 4 7 
link (2,5) 9 10 9 10  9 10 9 10 
link (2,8) 3 1 2 1  7 2 7 2 
link (3,8) 1 4 3 7  3 6 3 6 
link (4,9) 6 7 5 6  6 5 6 5 
link (5,7) 8 3 8 3  8 3 8 3 
 
As for the ЯRW importance measure, the disrupted components in both 
interdependent infrastructure networks have different ranks according to their 
importance and influence on the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks 
when considering complete or proportional disruptions, as shown in Table 3-6 and 
Table 3-7. That is, when the ЯRW importance measure is based on Model I and Model 
II provides different restoration priorities than when it is based on Model III and Model 
IV. However, this CIM gives the same rank when fixed or different recovery durations 
are considered for restoring the disrupted components in the interdependent 
infrastructure networks as the recovery durations are not taken into account in this CIM, 
see Table 3-6 and Table 3-7. Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 show that the ЯRW importance 
measure provides the same restoration priorities when it is based on Model I and Model 
III and also the same restoration priorities when it is based on Model II and Model IV, 
where the difference between each two models is the recovery durations of the 
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disrupted network components. That is, the restoration priorities according to the ЯRW 
importance measure are different when considering different disruption assumptions 
(i.e., partial or complete disruption) regardless of the recovery durations of the disrupted 
network components. 
In general, CIMs produce useful information for decision makers. They assist 
infrastructure decision makers by identifying the critical and influential components in 
their respective networks that affect the performance of their infrastructure networks the 
most when disrupted or restored following a disruptive event. For example, in this 
work, CIMs identify the most important disrupted network components to be restored 
according to their effect on the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks 
once they are recovered, ORT importance measure, or by the potential impact on the 
resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks caused by a specific disrupted 
network element, ЯRW importance measure, as discussed earlier in Section 4. Such 
information could be useful for decision makers in enabling more effective restoration 
priorities of the disrupted networks components or expediting the recovery process for 
some of the critical and influential ones. However, different CIMs are generally defined 
based on different perspectives of network performance that produce different 
information for decision makers. Hence, they could provide different restoration 
priorities of the disrupted network components based on their influence on the resilience 
of the interdependent infrastructure networks as shown in Table 3-6 and Table 3-7. 
Thus, decision makers might face a challenge of combining such information from 
different CIMs to obtain a unique set of restoration priorities of the disrupted network 
components. One means to identify the most important disrupted network components 
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to be restored through a unique set of restoration priorities based on multiple CIMs with 
different perspectives is with the use of a multi-criteria decision analysis tool such as 
TOPSIS [Almoghathawi et al. 2017a]. 
Moreover, the uncertain nature of disruptive events could lead to different 
prioritizations for the restoration of the disrupted network components when 
considering partial disruptions for the disrupted networks components (i.e., when the 
CIMs are based on Model II and Model IV). Such uncertainty in the nature of disruptive 
events is discussed in Section 3.4.3. In addition, we are considering the uncertainty in 
the recovery durations of the disrupted networks components for a future work. 
Figure 3-3 shows the improvement in the resilience of the each of the two 
considered interdependent infrastructure networks by restoring the disrupted 
components in both interdependent infrastructure networks according to their 
importance (i.e. restoration priorities) by the ORT importance measure based on Model 
I. Three restoration scenarios for restoring the disrupted components in the power and 
water networks are considered in Figure 3-3 which are: (i) restoring all the disrupted 
components in both network (“Both”), (ii) restoring the disrupted components in the 
power network only (“P only”), and (iii) restoring the disrupted components in the 
water network only (“W only”). Though there is a slight improvement in the resilience 
of the interdependent infrastructure networks individually when restoring the disrupted 
components in one network only, as in scenario (ii) or (iii), the resilience will only 
reach a certain level of improvement, as shown in Figure 3-3, unless the components of 
one network do not depend on any of the disrupted components in the other one in order 
to be functional (e.g., we consider restoration scenario (ii) and all the components in the 
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power network do not depend on any of the disrupted components of the water 
network). Figure 3-3 serves to illustrate the importance of considering the 
interdependent nature of the two networks when making restoration decisions. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3-3. Network resilience considering different restoration scenarios based on 
the ORT with Model I for the (a) power network, and (b) water network 
 
Figure 3-4 shows the improvement in the resilience of each of the two generated 
infrastructure networks along with the system of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks by restoring the partially disrupted components in both interdependent 
infrastructure networks according to their importance (i.e., restoration priorities or 
ranks) based on the ORT importance measure. Two restoration strategies for restoring 
the partially disrupted components in the power and water networks are considered in 
Figure 3-4 which are: (i) restoring all the partially disrupted components in both 
network according to their rank by ORT based on Model II, i.e., considering their 
partial disruptions (“P.M II” for power network, “W.M II” for water network, and “S.M 
II” for the system of interdependent infrastructure networks), see Table 3-6 and Table 
3-7, and (ii) restoring the partially disrupted components in both network according to 
their rank by ORT based on Model I, i.e., assuming a complete disruption for the 
disrupted components (“P.M I” for power network, “W.M I” for water network, and 
“S.M I” for the system of interdependent infrastructure networks), see Table 3-6 and 
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Table 3-7. Figure 3-4 shows the difference in the improvement of the resilience when 
restoring partially disrupted networks components according to their priorities based on 
the worst-case disruption scenario (i.e., completely disrupted) and current disruption 
scenario considering their partial disruptions. As a result, the rank of the disrupted 
components considering CD disruption scenario is not necessarily the best rank for 
them in all disruptions scenarios as shown in Figure 3-4, which illustrates the 
importance of considering the uncertain nature of the disruptive events when making 
restoration decisions.  
 
Figure 3-4. Network resilience considering different restoration scenarios by ORT 
 
3.4.3 Effects of Uncertainty 
In general, different disruption scenarios could lead to having different priorities 
for the restoration process of the disrupted components in the interdependent 
infrastructure networks, presented in Almoghathawi et al. [2017b]. To illustrate how the 
uncertain nature of the disruptive events could affect the ranking of the disrupted 
components in the interdependent infrastructure networks, we have considered a large 
number of different partial disruption scenarios generated randomly to find the 
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probability of the occurrence of each disrupted component in each priority position 
among other disrupted components.  
 
  
(a) Power network components by ORT (b) Water network components by ORT 
Figure 3-5. Heat Maps for the interdependent infrastructure networks by ORT 
 
  
(a) Power network components by ЯRW (b) Water network components by ЯRW 
Figure 3-6. Heat Maps for the interdependent infrastructure networks by ЯRW 
 
Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6 show the heat maps for the disrupted components in 
the power and water networks according to the two proposed resilience-based CIMs, 
ORT and ЯRW, respectively. Each heat map displays the disrupted components where 
the darker circle represents the higher probability of that disrupted component being 
ranked in that position. For example, link (1,8) in the power network has a higher 
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probability by ORT than other disrupted components in the same network to be ranked 
in the first position, R1, as the network component with the highest priority to be 
restored first, see Figure 3-5(a). Similarly, link (8,9) in the power network is always 
ranked by ЯRW in the last position, R10, as the least important network component to 
be restored as shown in Figure 3-6(a). 
3.4.4 Comparison with Non-Resilience-Based Measures 
In this section, we compare the rank of the disrupted components in the 
interdependent infrastructure networks found from the two proposed resilience-based 
CIMs with two other network centrality measures, flow centrality (FC) [Nicholson et al. 
2016] and betweenness centrality (BC) [Freeman et al. 1991, Girvan and Newman 
2002]. The comparison is made based on Model I. Furthermore, the trajectory of 
resilience is compared when restoration is guided by each of the four measures. 
The flow centrality CIM measures the contribution of a given network 
component to the maximum flow from all the supply nodes to all the demand nodes 
within the network. Accordingly, FC is defined as the ratio of the total volume of flow 
through a given network component to the maximum flow from all supply nodes to all 
demand nodes in the same network.  
Definition 5.3.2.1. (FC). The FC of a disrupted network component ∈ = ∪
 in network ∈ , denoted as , is defined in Eq. (3-38), where ( ) is the flow 
through component ∈  when determining the maximum flow from supply node 
∈  to demand node ∈  in network ∈  and  is the maximum flow from 
supply node ∈  to demand node ∈  in network ∈ . 
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=
∑ ( )∈ , ∈
∑ ∈ , ∈
 (3-38) 
The betweenness centrality CIM is similar to the flow centrality CIM, though it 
measures the contribution of a given network component to the number of geodesic 
paths, rather than maximum flow, from all the supply nodes to all the demand nodes 
within the network. Accordingly, BC is defined as the ratio of the total number of 
geodesic paths that go through a given network component to the total number of 
geodesic paths from all supply nodes to all demand nodes in the same network.  
Definition 5.3.2.2. (BC). The BC of a disrupted network component ∈ = ∪  
in network ∈ , denoted as , is defined in Eq. (3-39), where ( ) is the number 
of geodesic paths from supply node ∈  to demand node ∈  in network ∈  
that go through component ∈  and  is the total number of geodesic paths from 






Table 3-8 and Table 3-9 show the importance of each disrupted component in 
power and water, respectively, according to the two proposed resilience-based CIMs 
and the two network centrality measures, based on Model I. Note from Table 3-8 and 
Table 3-9 that each CIM has a different rank for prioritizing the restoration of the 
disrupted components for each infrastructure network. However, the more important 
aspect is the improvement in the resilience of the system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks with the recovery of the disrupted components according to 
each priority rank. 
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Table 3-8. Restoration priorities for the disrupted components in the power 





ORT ЯRW FC BC 
node 4 1 1 1 1 
node 5 4 2 2 3 
node 6 6 3 3 10 
link (1,8) 5 5 6 8 
link (2,4) 9 9 10 4 
link (3,9) 2 6 7 7 
link (4,7) 3 8 8 6 
link (5,6) 8 7 4 9 
link (6,8) 7 4 5 2 
link (8,9) 10 10 9 5 
 
Table 3-9. Restoration priorities for the disrupted components in the water 





ORT ЯRW FC BC 
node 4 7 5 3 4 
node 5 5 1 5 1 
node 6 2 2 10 10 
link (1,4) 10 10 9 7 
link (1,9) 4 4 2 5 
link (2,5) 9 9 6 2 
link (2,8) 3 7 7 3 
link (3,8) 1 3 1 9 
link (4,9) 6 6 4 8 
link (5,7) 8 8 8 6 
 
Figure 3-7 shows the resilience of the two interdependent infrastructure 
networks individually with the restoration order for the disrupted components in each 
network according to different CIMs (i.e., ORT, ЯRW, FC, and BC) based on Model I, 
considering a complete disruption for the disrupted network components with a fixed 
restoration time of one unit for each one of them. The resilience of the water network 
improves faster based on the FC restoration order for the disrupted components, as 
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shown Figure 3-7. However, the resilience of the system of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks improves faster when considering the restoration order by the 
two proposed resilience-based CIMs, ORT and ЯRW, as illustrated in Figure 3-8.  
Figure 3-8 shows the resilience of the system of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks over the restoration time horizon according restoration priorities for the 
disrupted components according to different CIMs (i.e., ORT, ЯRW, FC, and BC) 
based on Model I.  
(a) (b) 
Figure 3-7. Network resilience based on different CIM based on Model I for the (a) 
power network, and (b) water network 
 
  
Figure 3-8. Resilience of the set of interdependent infrastructure networks based 
on different CIM based on Model I 
 
The objective of this work is to enhance the resilience of the system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks given the physical interdependencies among 
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them. As stated earlier, the maximum flow of an interdependent infrastructure network 
from its multiple supply nodes to its multiple demand nodes is considered to be the 
function by which the network performance is measured, and its resilience is 
determined. Accordingly, the two CIMs, ORT and ЯRW, are proposed to help decision 
makers finding the best restoration priorities for the disrupted networks components that 
could achieve the highest level of resilience of the system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks. As a result, ORT and ЯRW should provide more effective 
restoration priorities that enhance the resilience of the system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks than when considering other CIMs, e.g., FC and BC, or a 
random restoration order.  
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Chapter 4 : Resilience-Driven Restoration Model for Interdependent 
Networks  
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we study the interdependent network restoration problem (INRP) 
following the occurrence of a disruptive event considering different disruption 
scenarios. We propose a resilience-driven multi-objective optimization model using 
MIP with the objectives of (i) maximizing the resilience of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks and (ii) minimizing the costs associated with the restoration 
process, including flow, disruption, and restoration costs. Moreover, the proposed MIP 
restoration model takes into account the availability of the time and resources 
considering that there is a set of available resources or work crews or that are specific to 
each network. There are two main assumptions for the proposed model: (i) the 
components of the interdependent infrastructure networks are either fully disrupted or 
undisrupted, (ii) the disrupted networks components have different restoration times for 
each one of them (i.e., the restoration time is not fixed or the same for all disrupted 
networks components). The model provides a set of prioritized restoration tasks to 
which to allocate and schedule available work crews considering the physical 
interdependence between the infrastructure networks such that the resilience of the 
interdependent infrastructure networks is maximized while the restoration cost is 
minimized. The proposed restoration model focuses on maximizing the resilience of the 
interdependent infrastructure networks to retain their performance level prior to the 
disruption. Hence, the disrupted components might not be all restored, especially if they 
do not have an effect on the resilience of the other networks. While this work addresses 
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interdependent network restoration, a resilience measure in the objective function will 
enable future explorations of the balance between “withstanding a disruption” and 
“recovering from a disruption.”   
4.2 Restoration Model 
In this section, we present the assumptions, notation, objectives and constraints 
of the proposed multi-objective restoration optimization model.  
4.2.1 Assumptions 
There are several assumptions and considerations for the proposed restoration 
optimization model: 
 Each infrastructure network consists of a set of components (used to generally refer 
to nodes and links) that are subjected to be completely disrupted. 
 Each disrupted component in each infrastructure network can be restored with 
different restoration durations (i.e., recovery durations are not fixed for all disrupted 
components). 
 Each disrupted component in each infrastructure network cannot be operational until 
it is completely restored (i.e., this model does not consider partial functioning). 
 A single work crew can work on restoring a single disrupted network component at 
a time, where they cannot leave the disrupted component until it is completely 
restored (i.e., this model considers a non-preemptive recovery process) 
 Each supply node, demand node, and link in each infrastructure network has a 
known supply capacity, demand, and flow capacity, respectively. 
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 The flow costs through each link, disruption (i.e., unmet demand) costs, and 
restoration costs for disrupted components in each infrastructure network are known 
and fixed. 
 The physical interdependence among different infrastructure networks is 
considered. That is, for a node in an infrastructure network to be operational, it 
requires a specific node from another infrastructure network to also be operational. 
 The number of available work crews for each infrastructure network (i.e., 
infrastructure-specific resources) for the restoration of its disrupted components is 
known and could be different from one infrastructure network to another. 
4.2.2 Notation 
The sets, parameters, and decision variables of the proposed optimization model 
to solve the INRP are shown in Table 4-1, Table 4-2, and Table 4-3, respectively. 
Table 4-1. Sets of the proposed restoration model 
 
 Time periods in the restoration horizon, = {1, … , } 
 Interdependent infrastructure networks,  
 Nodes in network ∈  
 Links in network ∈  
 Available resources for network ∈  
 Supply nodes in network ∈ , ⊆  
 Demand nodes in network ∈ , ⊆  
 Disrupted nodes in network ∈ , ⊆  
 Disrupted links in network ∈ , ⊆  
 
Interdependent nodes (i.e., ( , ), ,̅ ∈ Ψ indicates 
that node ̅ ∈  in network ∈  requires node ∈  
in network ∈  to be operational) 
 
The amount of supply at node ∈  in network ∈ , , is considered in this 
model to be the maximum flow from node ∈  to all demand nodes in network ∈
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. As such, , assumed to be time independent, can be obtained by solving the model 
(2-1) – (2-3). 
 
Table 4-2. Parameters of the proposed restoration model for network k ∈ K 
 
 
Amount of supply and demand at node ∈  and node 
∈ , respectively 
 Capacity of link ( , ) ∈  
 Weight, ∑ = 1∈  
 Total slacks at all demand nodes in before the disruption 
 Total slacks at all demand nodes in after the disruption 
 Unitary flow cost through link ( , ) ∈  
 Penalty of unmet demand in node ∈   
 Fixed restoration cost for node ∈   
ℎ  Fixed restoration cost for link ( , ) ∈   
 Restoration duration of node ∈    
 Restoration duration of link ( , ) ∈   
  
 
Table 4-3. Decision variables of the proposed restoration model for network k ∈ K 
at time t ∈ T 
 
 Amount of unmet demand, called slack, at node ∈  
 Amount of flow through link ( , ) ∈  
 A binary variable that equals 1 if node ∈  is 
operational; and 0 otherwise 
 A binary variable that equals 1 if link ( , ) ∈  is 
operational; and 0 otherwise 
 A binary variable that equals 1 if node ∈  is to be 
restored; and 0 otherwise 
̂  A binary variable that equals 1 if link ( , ) ∈  is to be 
restored; and 0 otherwise 
 
A binary variable that equals 1 if node ∈  is restored 
by work crew ∈ ; and 0 otherwise 
 A binary variable that equals 1 if link ( , ) ∈  is 
restored by work crew ∈ ; and 0 otherwise 
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4.2.3 Objectives 
There are two objectives for the proposed restoration model: (i) maximizing the 
resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure networks over the restoration 
time horizon, and (ii) minimizing the costs associated with the restoration process. The 
two objectives are discussed in the following sections. 
4.2.3.1 Resilience Objective 
The resilience, in this dissertation, is assumed to be a function of unmet demand, 
, or the extent to which demand in node  of network  is not being met at time  (as 
opposed to using , which is a fixed desired performance level of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks for our proposed model). Accordingly, slacks in the model 
represent the loss in the maximum flow and reducing them to a desired level represents 
a means to measure the effectiveness of the restoration process. Hence, the first 
objective function, the resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure 
networks, is represented mathematically by Eq. (4-1), where  is the weight of 
network ∈  such that ∑ = 1∈  and  and  represent the total slacks at all 
demand nodes in network ∈  before and after a disruption, respectively (i.e.,  
refers to the total original slacks at all demand nodes in network ∈  at time  and 
 refers to the total slacks at all demand nodes in network ∈  at time  following 
a disruptive event, , as shown in Figure 2-1). Moreover, ∑ − ∑ ∈ −
( − 1) − ∑ ( )∈  represents the cumulative recovery of network ∈  
over the restoration time horizon, where the recovery of the network at time ∈  is 
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determined by − ∑ ∈ , while the total loss in network ∈  is represented by 
( − ). 
 max 




4.2.3.2 Cost Objective 
 Three different costs associated with the restoration process are considered in 
the restoration model: (i) flow cost, (ii) disruption cost (i.e., penalties of unmet 
demand), and (iii) restoration cost. The flow cost is a unitary cost for the flow through 
link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈ . The disruption cost is a unitary cost of unmet demand 
at node ∈  in network ∈ . The restoration cost is a fixed cost for restoring node 
∈  and link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈ . Hence, the second objective function, 






( , )∈ ∈∈∈
 (4-2) 
4.2.4 Constraints 
Several sets of constraints are considered in the proposed restoration model: (i) 
network flow constraints, (ii) restoration constraints, (iii) interdependence constraints, 
(iv) logical link constraints for the network flow with restoration, and (v) constraints 
governing the nature of the decision variables. All sets of constraints are explained and 
formulated in the following sections. 
4.2.4.1 Network Flow Constraints 
 For each infrastructure network, the flow conservation at any (i) supply 
node, ∈ , (ii) transshipment node, ∈ \{ , }, and (iii) demand node, ∈  
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is represented by constraints (4-3), (4-4), and (4-5), respectively. Constraints (4-6) 
ensure that the flow through link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  at time ∈  does not 
exceed its capacity. 
( , )∈





= 0,     ∀ ∈ \{ , }, ∈ , ∈  
(4-4) 
( , )∈
+ = ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  
(4-5) 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-6) 
4.2.4.2 Restoration Constraints 
For node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈ ,  if it is selected to be 
restored, it is scheduled to be restored by work crew ∈  at time ∈ , as shown in 
constraints (4-7) and (4-8), respectively. Work crew ∈  in infrastructure network 
∈  can work on the restoration of a single disrupted network component, i.e., node 
∈  or link ( , ) ∈ , at time ∈ , as shown in constraints (4-9). Constraints 
(4-10) and (4-11) ensure that node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈ , respectively in network 
∈  is operational at time ∈  if it is restored by work crew ∈ . Constraints 
(4-12) and (4-13) ensure that node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈ , respectively in network 
∈  cannot be operational prior to its restoration duration. Similarly, work crew ∈
 cannot complete the restoration of node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈  prior to its 
restoration duration, as shown in constraints (4-14) and (4-15), respectively. 
=
∈












 { , }
∈
 { , }
( , )∈
 




, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-10) 
≤
∈
, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-11) 
= 0,       ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈  (4-12) 
= 0,       ∀ ∈ , ∈  (4-13) 
= 0,       ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈
∈
 (4-14) 
= 0,       ∀ ∈ , ∈
∈
 (4-15) 
4.2.4.3 Interdependence Constraints 
The physical interdependence among the different infrastructure networks is 
captured by constraints (4-16). This set of constraints ensure that for a node ̅ ∈  in 
network ∈  to be operational at time ∈ , node ∈  in network ∈  must be 
operational at time ∈  as well, where ( , ), ,̅ ∈ . 
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̅ − ≤ 0,     ∀ ( , ), ,̅ ∈ , ∈   (4-16) 
In this work considerate is assumed that for a dependent node to be operational, 
the other node or nodes upon which it depends must be operational. However, the 
proposed model could be easily generalized by adding a new parameter that captures all 
different cases of interdependencies [González et. al. 2016]: (i) a node can be 
operational if the other node or set of nodes that it depends on is operational, (ii) a node 
can be operational if at least one of the nodes that it depends on is operational, (iii) a 
node can be operational if a specific node or group of nodes from the set of the nodes 
that it depends on is operational, and (iv) a node depends partially on the functionality 
of a set of nodes.  
4.2.4.4 Logical Link Constraints of Network Flow to Restoration 
The flow through link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  is determined by the capacity 
of the link as well as the functionality status of the nodes at both ends on that link as 
shown in constraints (5-17) and (5-18). Furthermore, the capacity of link ( , ) ∈  in 
network ∈  is determined by functionality status of the link itself which is captured 
by constraints (5-19). 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-17) 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-18) 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-19) 
4.2.4.5 Constraints on the Nature of Decision Variables 
The amount of unmet demand (slack), , at node ∈  and flow through link 
( , ) ∈ , , in network ∈  must be non-negative at time ∈ , as shown in 
constraints (4-20) and (4-21), respectively. Constraints (4-22) and (4-23) represent the 
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restoration decision of node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈ , respectively in network ∈ . 
The functionality status of node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  at time 
∈  is represented by constraints (4-24) and (4-25), respectively. Finally, constraints 
(4-26) and (4-27) represent the binary restoration variables for node ∈  and link 
( , ) ∈  in network ∈  at time ∈ , respectively.  
≥ 0,      ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-20) 
≥ 0, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-21) 
̂ ∈ {0,1}, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈  (4-22) 
∈ {0,1}, ∀ ∈ , ∈  (4-23) 
∈ {0,1}, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-24) 
∈ {0,1}, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-25) 
∈ {0,1},     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-26) 
∈ {0,1},     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (4-27) 
4.2.5 Multi-Objective Optimization Technique 
The proposed optimization model has multiple objectives which could be 
difficult to solve since many tradeoff solutions between the multiple objectives must be 
identified for consideration in the restoration of interdependent infrastructure networks. 
Hence, different multi-objective optimization techniques can be applied to find tradeoff 
solutions. In this dissertation, we use ɛ-constraint method proposed by Haimes et al. 
[1971] to generate Pareto-optimal solutions for our restoration model as it does not 
aggregate the multiple objectives but instead minimizes one of them while the 
remaining objectives are constrained within given target values specified by decision 
makers. Accordingly, the multiple objectives of our proposed model, (4-1) and (4-2) 
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can be substituted by the new objective function (4-28) and the additional constraint 
(4-29), where ∈ [0,1] since we are dealing with the resilience of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks, and the value of the network resilience, Я( ), at time  is 






( , )∈ ∈∈∈
  (4-28) 
∑ − ∑ ∈ − ( − 1) − ∑ ( )∈
( − )
∈
≥  (4-29) 
4.3 Numerical Experiment 
4.3.1 Networks Data 
We illustrate our proposed restoration model in this work with fictional 
interdependent infrastructure networks (i.e., power and water), using the extended 
algorithm for proximal topology generator proposed by Xin-Jian [2007] described in 
Section 3.4.1. The two interdependent infrastructure networks are generated using R 
platform. Accordingly, the two interdependent infrastructure networks are generated as 
illustrated in Figure 4-1. The general properties for each network are shown in Table 
4-4 which includes the number of nodes, number of undirected links, number of supply 
nodes, number of demand nodes, and average node degree, respectively.   
 
Table 4-4. General properties of the interdependent infrastructure networks 
 
Network     〈 〉 
Power 25 31 5 5 2.48 





Figure 4-1. An example of interdependent infrastructure networks 
 
4.3.2 Disruption Scenarios 
Interdependent infrastructure networks are subjected to different scenarios of 
disruptions which could affect their performances differently. These disruption 
scenarios can be categorized into three groups [Wang et al. 2013]: random failures, 
malevolent attacks, and spatial failures. Random failures include common failures and 
manmade accidents such as aging, operating errors, and poor maintenance. For this 
scenario of disruptions, interdependent network components (nodes or links) are 
removed randomly with equal failure probability for all components. Malevolent attacks 
reflect intelligent attacks such as terrorism where important network components are 
targeted. Two scenarios are considered for malevolent attacks: capacity-based, where 
components with higher capacity are targeted, and degree-based, where components 
with higher degree (i.e., connections with other components) are targeted. For the 
capacity-based scenario, the capacities of the internal nodes are determined as the min 
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of the sum of capacities for the incoming and outgoing links, respectively (i.e., =
min {∑( , )∈ , ∑ }( , )∈ , where is the capacity of node  in network  and  is 
the set of links in network ). For the degree-based scenario, the degree of link ( , ) is 
defined as the average of the degree of node  and node  (i.e., deg = (deg + deg ), 
where the degree of node  is the number of connections it has with other nodes in the 
network). Hence, interdependent network components are removed from their networks 
according to their capacity or degree where the components with the highest capacity or 
degree have higher failure probabilities than others. Finally, spatial failures capture 
natural disasters, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, that disrupt geographical 
locations. Consequently, the spatial disruptions affect the components of the 
interdependent infrastructure networks that are spatially closed to each other (i.e., can 
be affected by the same local disruption). In this work, the area of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks is divided into multiple regions where if a disruption occurs in a 
region, all the interdependent infrastructure networks components within that region 
will be disrupted and hence removed from their networks. 
4.3.3 Experimental Results 
Considering the different possible scenarios of disruptions discussed in Section 
4.3.2 (“Random” for random failures, “Capacity” for capacity-based malevolent attacks, 
“Degree” for degree-based malevolent attacks, and “Spatial” for spatial failures), the 
efficiency of each interdependent infrastructure network with the removal of a fraction 
of components (nodes or links) of the interdependent infrastructure networks is 
illustrated in Figure 4-2. Efficiency is measured as the ratio of the current max flow 
over the original max flow. It can be observed from Figure 4-2 that the removal of the 
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components of the interdependent infrastructure networks with the highest capacity 
result in the largest decline in the individual network efficiencies as the fraction of 
components removal increases. On the other hand, the spatial removal of the 
components of the interdependent infrastructure networks mostly result in the smallest 
drop in the individual networks efficiencies among other disruptions scenarios which 
could because of the existence of alternative routes within the networks since it affects a 
specific area in the network. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 4-2. Network efficiency with fraction components removals of the system of 
interdependent networks considering four disruption scenarios for (a) power 
network, and (b) water network 
 
To assess the proposed multi-objective restoration model, a subset of the Pareto 
optimal set (i.e. non-dominated solutions) were obtained using Python 2.7 with Gurobi 
7.5, see Figure 4-3, by varying the value of  and solve the optimization model again for 
each value of ɛ. Figure 4-3 illustrates the generation of different points of the subset of 
Pareto front using different values of  (i.e., ∈ [0.5,1]) considering the availability of 
one work crew for each network during the restoration process with different possible 
scenarios of disruptions, see Section 4.3.2. In addition, the restoration cost is considered 
for Figure 4-3 to be higher than the unmet demand cost for node ∈  in network ∈
 (i.e.,  
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> ). Otherwise, the resilience will always be 1 given that there is enough time to 
recover the essential components because both objectives are focused on unmet 
demand, and by doing so, the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks 
will be maximized, and the total cost associated with the restoration will be minimized 
as well. In Figure 4-3, the horizontal axis represents the resilience of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks for which a maximum is sought, while the vertical axis 
represents total cost (i.e., restoration cost, flow cost, and disruption cost) that we would 
like to minimize. As observed in Figure 4-3, the total cost associated with the 
restoration process increases as the value of ɛ (i.e., the minimum value of the 
interdependent infrastructure networks resilience desired) increases. The lowest value of 
objective 1 (i.e. resilience) for all different scenarios of disruptions in Figure 4-3 is 
when = 0.5 while the highest value is when = 1. Hence, Figure 4-3 serves to 
illustrate the tradeoffs between the two objectives of the restoration model where when 
a higher level of resilience is desired for the systems of interdependent infrastructure 
networks, the total cost associated with the restoration process will be higher. 
 
Figure 4-3. Objectives tradeoffs 
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Without loss of generality, we consider the following parameter distributions 
and values for illustrative purposes of the proposed multi-objective restoration model: 
= 1/| |, = 50, , ℎ , ∼ (20,50), ∼ (1,10), = 60, and , ∼
(1,5). In this chapter, the disruption cost for node ∈  in network ∈ , , is 
considered higher than its restoration cost, , since we are aiming to maximize the 
resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure networks. Hence, both 
objectives will be focusing on minimizing the unmet demand at node ∈  in 
network ∈ . The proposed restoration model was solved using Python 2.7 with 
Gurobi 7.5. Accordingly, Figure 4-4 through Figure 4-7 depict the trajectory of 
interdependent infrastructure network resilience considering the three different 
scenarios for availability of the work crews (WC): one, two, and three work crews with 
random, capacity-based, degree-based, and spatial disruptions, respectively which could 
help decision makers when developing their restoration plans following a disruptive 
event (e.g., considering more work crews for one network than the other). The 
percentages of disrupted components in the interdependent power-water networks are: 
21%, 21%, 21%, and 32% for the scenarios of random, capacity-based, degree-based, 
and spatial disruptions, respectively. The disrupted components in the first three 
disruptions scenarios are: 10 nodes, 5 from each network, and 14 bi-directional links, 7 
from each network. For the spatial disruptions: 15 nodes, 9 from the power network and 
6 from the water network, and 21 bi-directional links, 12 from the power network and 9 
from the water network. Moreover, the number of removed components from the 
interdependent infrastructure networks in the first three disruption scenarios are equal, 
10 nodes and 14 links, as we are removing them individually according to specific 
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criteria (i.e., random, highest capacity, highest degree). However, for the spatial 
disruption scenario, they are removed according to their locations (i.e., if a disruption 
occurs in a region, all the interdependent infrastructure networks components within 
that region will be disrupted and hence removed from their networks).   
(a) (b) 
Figure 4-4. Trajectory of network resilience considering random disruption and 
different number of work crews for (a) power network, and (b) water network 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 4-5. Trajectory of network resilience considering capacity-based disruption 
and different number of work crews for (a) power network, and (b) water network 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 4-6. Trajectory of network resilience considering degree-based disruption 
and different number of work crews for (a) power network, and (b) water network 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 4-7. Trajectory of network resilience considering spatial disruption and 
different number of work crews for (a) power network, and (b) water network 
 
As can be observed from Figure 4-4 through Figure 4-7, considering more work 
crews helps in achieving full resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks 
earlier. However, it could take longer time in an individual network than the others 
though they are assigned same number of work crews because of their 
interdependencies. For example, considering the random, capacity-based, and degree-
based disruptions scenarios, water network took longer time to be fully resilient than 
power network as it depends on some nodes on power network which were disrupted 
and need to be restored first, see Figure 4-4 through Figure 4-6. Similarly, power 
network took longer time to be fully resilient than water network considering spatial 
disruption scenario due to its dependency on some disrupted nodes on water network, 
see Figure 4-7. Hence, assigning more work crews to restore the disrupted components 
in one network than the other could help in reaching the maximum level of resilience of 
the system of interdependent infrastructure networks faster considering the available 
time periods. In general, there are three factors that affect the progress of improvement 
for the resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure networks: (i) the set of 
disrupted components in the interdependent infrastructure networks, (ii) the nature of 
the interdependencies among the infrastructure networks, and (iii) the number of 
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available work crews for each infrastructure network during the restoration process. 
Furthermore, the available time period and budget for the restoration process can decide 
what will be the maximum level of resilience that the system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks can reach. Accordingly, what are the disrupted components in 
the interdependent infrastructure networks need to be restored. 
The proposed resilience-driven multi-objective restoration model focuses on 
maximizing the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks to retain their 
performance level prior to the disruption. Hence, the disrupted components might not be 
all restored, especially if they do not have an effect on the resilience of the other 
networks. Accordingly, the full resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks 
could be achieved prior to complete restoration of these networks (i.e., time to full 
resilience (TFR) ≤ time to complete restoration (TCR) [Barker et al. 2013, Baroud et al. 
2014]). Table 4-5 shows a comparison between the time when the interdependent 
power-water networks are fully resilient and the time when all the disrupted 
components are restored considering the different disruptions scenarios discussed 
earlier. 
Table 4-5. Comparison between time to full resilience (TFR) and time to complete 
restoration (TCR) for the system of interdependent infrastructure networks 






 Two work 
crews 
 Three work 
crews 
TFR TCR  TFR TCR  TFR TCR 
Random 30 45  21 31  11 16 
Capacity 41 50  26 31  14 18 
Degree 22 41  16 29  10 20 
Spatial 46 83  26 45  16 29 
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4.4 Progressive Restoration Approach 
For large-scale networks or disruptions, it is difficult to obtain optimal 
restoration decisions for the disrupted components (i.e., prioritization, assignment and 
scheduling). Accordingly, our primary question is how can we make restoration 
decisions in a timely manner based on the proposed optimization model for the 
disrupted components of the system of interdependent infrastructure networks 
considering their interdependencies? Hence, in this section, we propose a progressive 
restoration approach (PRA) for the restoration model of the system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks considering: (i) fixed recovery durations, and (ii) different 
recovery durations, for the disrupted components.  
4.5.1 PRA – I (Fixed Recovery Durations) 
In this approach, we reduce the scale of the problem by restoring the disrupted 
components in the system of interdependent infrastructure networks in multiple 
restoration stages. At each stage, a set of disrupted components (nodes and links), ℋ, is 
restored for each infrastructure network within a practical time considering the 
availability of time and resources (i.e., work crews). Hence, ℋ represents the maximum 
number of disrupted components that can be restored at a single stage of the restoration 
process. Accordingly, ℋ is a function of  and , where  is the number of 
components restored simultaneously in a subset, hence,  can be determined by the 
number of available work crews; and  is the number of subsets in one stage, hence,  
can be determined by how many components can be restored by a work crew in a single 
restoration stage. A depiction of the set ℋ is represented in Figure 4-8. 
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Figure 4-8. Illustration of the set of disrupted network components to be restored 
at each stage 
 
4.5.2 PRA – II (Different Recovery Durations) 
There are two approaches to solve the restoration model of the system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks considering different recovery durations for the 
disrupted components. 
4.5.2.1 PRA – II (A)  
In this approach, we solve the restoration problem in two phases: 
Phase I: Prioritize the disrupted components according to their criticality and 
importance based on their effect on the resilience of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks with the following considerations: 
 Priorities are based on the optimal recovery time (ORT) component 
importance measure.  
 The recovery time horizon is reduced to  time periods for obtaining the 
disrupted components restoration priorities.  
 The applicable restoration optimization model for the ORT CIM, 
presented earlier in Section 3.2, is solved iteratively until the priorities of 
all disrupted components are obtained. 
Phase II: Assign and schedule the disrupted components in the system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks to the available work crews for each infrastructure network 
according to their priorities. 
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4.5.2.2 PRA – II (B)  
In this approach, we also solve the restoration problem in two phases, where the 
main difference with PRA – II (A) is the second phase. Accordingly, the two phases for 
this approach are: 
Phase I: same as in Phase I in PRA – II (A). 
Phase II: Solve the original restoration model of the system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks considering the restoration priorities of the disrupted 
components. 
4.5.3 Illustrative Example 
We consider two examples of a system of generated interdependent 
infrastructure networks: (i) System 1 (150 nodes), and (ii) System 2 (300 nodes), as 
shown in Figure 4-9. The general properties for each system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks are shown in Table 4-6 which includes number of: nodes, 
undirected links, source nodes, and demand nodes, as well as the average node degree 
for each network. Three scenarios of disruptions are considered: degree-based, capacity-
based, and spatial, which are discussed earlier in Section 4.3.2. Moreover, we consider 
three disruption sizes: 10%, 20%, and 30% disruptions. The number of disrupted 
components for both interdependent infrastructure networks examples are shown in 
Table 4-6. The two approaches were solved using Python 2.7 with Gurobi 7.5. 
Table 4-6. General properties of the interdependent infrastructure networks 
 
System     〈 〉 
Disrupted components 
10% 20% 30% 
1 150 188 50 50 2.51 35 69 103 







Figure 4-9. An interdependent infrastructure networks example with (a) 150 
nodes, and (b) 300 nodes 
 
When considering fixed recovery durations for disrupted network components, 
the optimal solution was easily obtained for System 1 of interdependent infrastructure 
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networks (i.e., 150-node) and the trajectory of system resilience considering different 
disruption sizes and average of disruption scenarios is shown in Figure 4-10. However, 
for System 2 of interdependent infrastructure networks (i.e., 300-node), the optimal 
solution was obtained but after a long running time for the model. Hence, we need to 
solve the model with PRA – I. 
 
Figure 4-10. Network resilience considering different disruption sizes and 
average of disruption scenarios 
 
To apply PRA – I, first we need to determine the set ℋ. In this work, we 
consider the availability of six work crews, hence,  equals 6.  The number of 
components to be restored by each work crew, , is obtained by finding the best 
combination of computational time and optimality gap for the worst restoration 
scenario, spatial disruption in this example. Hence, we consider a set of feasible realistic 
options for , (i.e., 1, 2, or 3) as shown in Figure 4-11, after which the computational 
time was not practical. Accordingly, we consider  to be equal 2 (i.e., each work crew 
can restore at most two components in one stage). As a result, ℋ would be 12 (i.e., at 
most 12 disrupted components can be restored at each stage).  
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Figure 4-11. Computational time and optimality gap for the worst restoration 
scenario, spatial disruption, considering fixed recovery durations 
 
Figure 4-12 shows the trajectory of the resilience enhancement for System 2 
obtained by the MIP restoration model and the proposed solution approach, PRA – I, 
considering the average of the three disruptions scenarios (i.e., degree-based, capacity-
based, and spatial) with the disruption size of 30% of the whole system. As it can be 
observed from Figure 4-12, both solutions are almost identical, and the proposed 
approach provided close results to the optimal solution of the restoration model.  
 
Figure 4-12. Network resilience considering disruption size of 30% and average 
of disruption scenarios for System 2 
 
In addition,  Table 4-7 shows the computational time of the MIP restoration 
model and PRA – I and optimality gap with the restoration model for System 2 
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considering fixed recovery durations for disrupted components and different disruption 
scenarios (i.e., degree-based, capacity-based, spatial) along with different disruption 
sizes (i.e., 10%, 20%, 30%). 






MIP  PRA – I 
Time (s) Gap (%) Time (s) Gap (%)
Degree 
10% 2.45 0.00 1.30 0.00
20% 23.06 0.00 3.39 0.00
30% 1479.85 0.00 11.77 0.01
    
Capacity 
10% 2.54 0.00 0.67 0.00
20% 12.70 0.00 1.72 0.00
30% 54.58 0.00 3.50 0.19
    
Spatial 
10% 1.98 0.00 0.78 0.00
20% 113.55 0.00 4.28 1.38
30% 4160.90 0.00 9.88 1.53
 
On the other hand, the optimal solution was difficult to obtain considering 
different recovery durations for disrupted networks components. Hence, we need to 
apply the proposed approach, PRA – II to get a solution in practical time. Accordingly, 
for phase I, we need to determine the reduced time horizon, , to obtain the priorities of 
the disrupted networks components. So, we consider a similar technique to the 
determination of the number of subset in each restoration stage, , for PRA – I (i.e., 
when considering fixed recovery durations for disrupted network components). Thus, 
the reduced time horizon, , is obtained by finding the best combination of 
computational time and optimality gap for the worst restoration scenario, spatial 
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disruption in this example. Hence, we consider a set of feasible realistic options for , 
(i.e., 5, 6, or 7) as shown in Figure 4-13, after which the computational time was not 
practical. The minimum value of the set of feasible options is set to 5 which is equal to 
the maximum recovery time of any disrupted network component in this example. 
Accordingly, we consider  to be equal 7 (i.e., the model will run iteratively 
considering 7 time periods in each iteration until the priorities of all disrupted network 
components are obtained). 
 
Figure 4-13. Computational time and optimality gap for the worst restoration 
scenario, spatial disruption, considering different recovery durations 
 
Figure 4-14 shows the trajectory of the resilience enhancement for System 1 
obtained by the MIP restoration model and the proposed solution approaches for 
different recovery durations, PRA – II (A) and (B), considering the average of the three 
disruptions scenarios (i.e., degree-based, capacity-based, and spatial) with the disruption 
size of 30% of the whole system. Similarly, Figure 4-15 shows the trajectory of the 
resilience enhancement for System 2 obtained by the MIP restoration model, PRA – II 
(A), and PRA – II (B) considering the average of the three disruptions scenarios with 
the disruption size of 20% of the whole system since the optimal solution could not be 
obtained, within 21600 seconds, for some disruption scenarios.  
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Figure 4-14. Network resilience considering disruption size of 30% and average 
of disruption scenarios for System 1 
 
 
Figure 4-15. Network resilience considering disruption size of 20% and average 
of disruption scenarios for System 2 
 
As it can be observed from Figure 4-14 and Figure 4-15, both PRA – II (A) and 
PRA – II (B) perform well with respect to the optimal solution obtained by the MIP 
restoration model since the resilience curves are close to each other. However, PRA – II 
(B) provide better results than PRA – II (A) for both System 1 and System 2, see Figure 
4-14 and Figure 4-15.  
Moreover, Table 4-8 shows the computational time of PRA – II (A) and (B) and 
their optimality gap with respect to the restoration model for System 1 considering 
different disruption scenarios (i.e., degree-based, capacity-based, spatial) along with 
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different disruption sizes (i.e., 10%, 20%, 30%). Likewise, Table 4-9 shows the 
computational time of PRA – II (A) and (B) along with their optimality gap with respect 
to the restoration model for System 2 considering different disruption scenarios along 
with different disruption sizes. Furthermore, for some instances, the optimal solution is 
not obtained by the MIP restoration model during the set run time for the model (i.e., 
21600 seconds) as shown in Table 4-9 for degree-based and spatial disruption scenarios 
with 30% disruption size for System 2. For such cases, we compare the solutions 
obtained by the proposed approaches, PRA – II (A) and (B), with the lower bound of 
the MIP restoration model when the model terminates (i.e., after 21600 seconds). 
Hence, the optimality gap of obtained solutions by PRA – II (A) and (B) are the upper 
bounds of the actual optimality gap of these solutions.  
 






MIP  PRA – II (A)  PRA – II (B) 
Time (s) Gap (%) Time (s) Gap (%) Time (s) Gap (%)
Degree 
10% 3.93 0.00 1.99 0.99 0.99 0.00
20% 11.25 0.00 3.02 3.49 1.58 0.92
30% 355.88 0.00 7.95 4.64 5.00 2.08
    
Capacity 
10% 1.93 0.00 1.12 0.00 0.52 0.00
20% 31.04 0.00 3.89 3.88 2.53 2.14
30% 242.02 0.00 6.19 4.97 8.08 3.24
    
Spatial 
10% 3.78 0.00 1.93 3.05 1.02 0.00
20% 32.40 0.00 3.98 8.55 3.53 3.17
30% 445.85 0.00 8.09 7.83 9.16 2.10
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MIP  PRA – II (A)  PRA – II (B) 
Time (s) Gap (%)  Time (s) Gap (%) Time (s) Gap (%)
Degree 
10% 12.96 0.00  4.20 2.69 1.58 1.38
20% 2262.40 0.00  12.22 3.85 23.23 1.95
30% 21600.00 1.20  23.86 5.75  148.82 3.85
     
Capacity 
10% 9.78 0.00  3.99 6.14 1.77 1.90
20% 241.42 0.00  11.39 3.53 24.33 1.77
30% 1765.14 0.00  16.70 4.24 149.33 2.34
     
Spatial 
10% 10.37 0.00  4.08 2.15 2.17 0.66
20% 1434.20 0.00  10.49 10.35 25.33 2.91
30% 21600.00 5.00  23.80 8.71 177.00 5.20
 
Though PRA – II (A) gives results faster the PRA – II (B), PRA – II (B) 
provides better solutions (i.e., smaller optimality gap with respect to the optimal 
solution), as shown in Table 4-8 and Table 4-9. Hence, it is a tradeoff, that can be 
decided by decision makers, between the run time of the model and the gap with the 
optimal solution.   
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Chapter 5 : Exploring Recovery Strategies for Optimal 
Interdependent Network Resilience  
4.3 Introduction 
In this chapter, we propose a general resilience-driven multi-objective 
optimization model to solve the INRP using MIP with the objectives of: (i) maximizing 
the resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure networks, and (ii) 
minimizing the total costs associated with the restoration process (i.e., flow, restoration, 
and disruption costs). The proposed model expands on the restoration model discussed 
in Chapter 4, by not only considering: (i) binary status of the networks components (i.e., 
either fully disrupted or undisrupted), (ii) complete dependence between nodes (i.e., a 
dependent node cannot be functioning unless the node or nodes that it depends on are 
completely functioning), and (iii) non-preemptive recovery process, but also 
considering: (iv) partial disruptions for the disrupted network components, (v) partial 
recovery of the disrupted network components considering their different restoration 
rates which allows for a preemptive recovery process , and (vi) partial dependence 
between nodes (i.e., a dependent node could be partially functioning if the node or 
nodes it depends on are partially functioning as well). Furthermore, the proposed 
optimization model takes into account the availability of the time and network-specific 
resources (i.e., a set of available resources or work crews or that are specific to each 
network). Different recovery strategies are explored considering different assumptions 
for work crews and disrupted component functionality. The proposed optimization 
model focuses on maximizing the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks to retain their performance level prior to the disruption. Hence, the disrupted 
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networks components might: (i) not be all restored, especially if they do not influence 
the resilience of the other networks, or (ii) restored partially, if they could be 
functioning partially.  Next section gives and overview regarding network resilience and 
how it can be quantified 
4.4 Optimization Model 
In this section, we present the assumptions, notation, objectives, and constraints 
of the proposed optimization model for solving the INRP. 
4.4.1 Assumptions 
There are several assumptions for the proposed optimization model: 
 Each infrastructure network consists of a set of components (used to generally refer 
to nodes and links) that are subjected to be partially or completely disrupted. 
 Each disrupted component in each infrastructure network can be restored with 
different restoration rates (i.e., recovery durations are not fixed). 
 Each disrupted component in each infrastructure network could be partially 
recovered according to their restoration rates, which allow for a preemptive 
recovery process. Accordingly, different work crews can work to restore the same 
disrupted network component at different time periods. 
 A single work crew can work on restoring a disrupted network component at a time. 
 Each supply node, demand node, and link in each infrastructure network has a 
known supply capacity, demand, and flow capacity, respectively. 
 The flow costs through each link, disruption costs, and restoration costs for 
disrupted components in each infrastructure network are known and fixed. 
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 The physical interdependence among different infrastructure networks is 
considered. That is, for a node in an infrastructure network to be operational, it 
requires a specific node from another infrastructure network to also be operational. 
 The model allows for partial interdependencies considering: (i) partial status of 
disruption, or (ii) partial recovery of a disrupted component, i.e., a node could be 
operating partially if the other node upon which it depends is operating partially too. 
 The number of available work crews for each infrastructure network (i.e., 
infrastructure-specific resources) for the restoration of its disrupted components is 
known and could be different from one infrastructure network to another. 
4.4.2 Notation 
The sets, parameters, and decision variables of the proposed optimization model 
to solve the INRP are shown in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3, respectively. 
 
Table 5-1. Sets of the proposed optimization model 
 
 Time periods in the restoration horizon, = {1, … , } 
 Interdependent infrastructure networks,  
 Nodes 
 Links 
′ Disrupted nodes 
′ Disrupted links 
 Nodes in network ∈ , ⋃ ∈ =  
 Links in network ∈ , ⋃ ∈ =  
 Available resources for network ∈  
 Supply nodes in network ∈ , ⊆  
 Demand nodes in network ∈ , ⊆  
 Disrupted nodes in network ∈ , ⊆ , ⋃ ′∈ = ′ 
 Disrupted links in network ∈ , ⊆ , ⋃ ′∈ = ′ 
 
Interdependent nodes (i.e., ( , ), ,̅ ∈ Ψ indicates that 
node ̅ ∈  in network ∈  requires node ∈  in 
network ∈  to be operational) 
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Table 5-2. Parameters of the proposed optimization model for network k ∈ K 
 
 Supply capacity at node ∈  
 Demand at node ∈  
 Capacity of link ( , ) ∈  
 Weight, ∑ = 1∈  
 Total slacks at all demand nodes in before the disruption 
 Total slacks at all demand nodes in after the disruption 
 Unitary flow cost through link ( , ) ∈  
 Penalty of unmet demand in node ∈  at time ∈  
 Fixed restoration cost for node ∈  at time ∈  
ℎ  Fixed restoration cost for link ( , ) ∈  at time ∈  
 Restoration rate of node ∈   at time ∈  
 Restoration rate of link ( , ) ∈  at time ∈  
 Initial operational status of node ∈  after a disruption 
 Initial operational status of link ( , ) ∈  after a 
disruption 
 Number of units in node ∈ , ∈ ℤ  
 Number of units in link ( , ) ∈ , ∈ ℤ  
 
Terms  and  refer to the number of units in node ∈  and link( , ) ∈ , 
respectively, that can work independently from each other. For example, the number of 
units in a highway (i.e., a link in a transportation network) could be represented by the 
number of lanes in that highway. Consequently, the status of nodes and links is 
represented by the operational units in each one of them. That is, if a network 
component has more than one unit, it could be functioning partially depending on the 
number of operational units in that component following a disruption in two cases: (i) if 
it is not completely disrupted, or (ii) after a partial recovery. On the other hand, in case 
if a disrupted network component cannot be operational unless it is fully recovered, the 
number of units in this network component is assumed to be one, since the component 
cannot be functioning partially.  
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Table 5-3. Decision variables of the proposed optimization model for network k ∈ 
K at time t ∈ T 
 
 Amount of supply at node ∈   
 Amount of unmet demand, called slack, at node ∈  
 Amount of flow through link ( , ) ∈  
 Status of node ∈   
 Status of link ( , ) ∈   
 Number of operational units in node ∈   
 Number of operational units in link ( , ) ∈   
 
A binary variable that equals 1 if node ∈  is restored 
by work crew ∈ ; and 0 otherwise 
 A binary variable that equals 1 1 if link ( , ) ∈  is 
restored by work crew ∈ ; and 0 otherwise 
 
4.4.3 Objectives 
The proposed mathematical model for solving the INRP focuses on optimizing 
two main objectives: (i) maximizing a measure of resilience for the collective set of 
networks, and (ii) minimizing the total costs associated with the restoration process. The 
two objectives are explained in more detail in the following sections. 
4.4.3.1 Resilience Objective 
We assume that resilience is a function of unmet demand, , or the extent to 
which demand in node  of network  is not being met at time . Accordingly, slacks 
represent the loss in the maximum flow, and reducing them to a desired level represents 
a means to measure the effectiveness of the restoration process. Hence, the first 
objective function, the resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure 
networks, is represented mathematically by Eq. (5-1). Moreover,  refers to the total 
original slacks at all demand nodes in network ∈  at time  and  refers to the 
total slacks at all demand nodes in network ∈  at time  following a disruptive 
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event, , as shown in Figure 2-1. Also, ( ( ) − ) determines the recovery at node 
∈  in network ∈  at time ∈ . Hence, ∑ ( ) −∈  represents the 
recovery of network ∈  at time ∈  and ( − ) represents the total loss in 
network ∈  following a disruptive event 
max 
∑ ∑ ( ) −∈
−
∈
  (5-1) 
4.4.3.2 Cost Objective:  
Three different costs associated with the restoration process are considered in 
the optimization model for solving the INRP: (i) flow cost, (ii) disruption cost (i.e., 
penalties of unmet demand), and (iii) restoration cost. The flow cost is a unitary cost for 
the flow through link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈ . The disruption cost is a unitary cost 
of unmet demand at node ∈  in network ∈ . The restoration cost is a fixed cost 
for restoring node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  based on their 
restoration rates,  and , respectively. Hence, the system cost (second objective 
function) can be represented mathematically by Eq. (5-2). 
min +








Several sets of constraints are considered in the proposed optimization model for 
solving the INRP: (i) network flow constraints, (ii) restoration constraints, (iii) 
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interdependence constraints, (iv) logical link constraints for the network flow with 
restoration, and (v) constraints governing the nature of the decision variables. All sets of 
constraints are explained and formulated in the following sections. 
4.4.4.1 Network Flow Constraints 
For each infrastructure network, the flow conservation at each of its (i) supply 
nodes, ∈ , (ii) transshipment nodes, ∈ \{ , }, and (iii) demand nodes, ∈
 is represented by constraints (5-3), (5-4), and (5-5), respectively. Constraints (5-6) 
ensure that the flow through link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  at time ∈  does not 
exceed its capacity. Constraints (5-7) ensure that the amount of slack or unmet demand, 
, at node ∈  in network ∈  at time ∈  does not exceed the required 
demand at that node.  
−
( , )∈( , )∈










− = − , ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  
(5-5) 
− ≤ 0, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-6) 
− ≤ 0, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-7) 
4.4.4.2 Restoration Constraints:  
Work crew ∈  in infrastructure network ∈  can work on the restoration 
of a single disrupted network component, node ∈  or link ( , ) ∈ , as shown in 
constraints (5-8). Constraints (5-9) and (5-10) ensure that for network ∈ , only a 
single work crew is assigned to work on the restoration of node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈
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, respectively, at time ∈ . The recovery status of node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈  
in network ∈  is determined by constraints (5-11) and (5-12), respectively, which 
represent the status of the disrupted components after the occurrence of a disruptive 
event along with the recovery progress of these disrupted components by the available 

















, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-11) 
≤ +
∈
, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-12) 
4.4.4.3 Interdependence Constraints:  
The physical interdependence among the different infrastructure networks is 
captured by constraints (5-13). This set of constraints ensure that for a node ̅ ∈  in 
network ∈  to be operational at time ∈ , node ∈  in network ∈  must be 
operational at time ∈  as well, where ( , ), ,̅ ∈ . 
̅ − ≤ 0, ∀ ( , ), ,̅ ∈ , ∈   (5-13) 
In this work considerate is assumed that for a dependent node to be operational, 
the other node or nodes upon which it depends must be operational. However, the 
proposed model could be easily generalized by adding a new parameter that captures all 
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different cases of interdependencies [González et. al. 2016]: (i) a node can be 
operational if the other node or set of nodes that it depends on is operational, (ii) a node 
can be operational if at least one of the nodes that it depends on is operational, (iii) a 
node can be operational if a specific node or group of nodes from the set of the nodes 
that it depends on is operational, and (iv) a node depends partially on the functionality 
of a set of nodes.  
4.4.4.4 Logical Link Constraints of Network Flow to Restoration:  
The number of operational units,  and , in node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈
 in network ∈  at time ∈ , respectively, are based on their operational state 
and determined by constraints (5-14) and (5-15), respectively. For example, in a 
transportation network, if a highway has four lanes, then the number of units in this 
highway will be four where each lane represents 25% of that highway. So, if the 
highway is completely disrupted and then recovered 50%, then two lanes will be 
operational. However, if it is 60% recovered, then again still two lanes will be working 
until the link is 75% recovered such that a third lane will then be available, and so on. 
Hence, the amount of supply at node ∈  in network ∈  could be affected by how 
many units are operational at that node, as governed by constraints (5-16). Also, the 
flow through link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  is determined by the capacity of the link 
as well as the number of the operational units in the nodes at both ends on that link as 
shown in constraints (5-17) and (5-18). Furthermore, the capacity of link ( , ) ∈  in 
network ∈  is determined by the number of the operational units in the link itself 
which is captured by constraints (5-19). 
≥ ,           ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈   (5-14) 
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≥ , ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-15) 
− ( / ) ≤ 0, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-16) 
− ( / ) ≤ 0, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-17) 
− ( / ) ≤ 0, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-18) 
− / ≤ 0, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-19) 
4.4.4.5 Constraints on the Nature of Decision Variables: 
For infrastructure network ∈ , the amount of supply, , slack for unmet 
demand, , and flow through link ( , ) ∈ , , must be non-negative at time ∈ , 
as shown in constraints (5-20), (5-21), and (5-22), respectively. Constraints (5-23) and 
(5-24) represent the status of node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  at time 
∈ , respectively, which is continuous depending on the magnitude of damage 
occurred at each one of them and their recovery progress. The number of operational 
units in node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  at time ∈  must be non-
negative integer, see constraints (5-25) and (5-26), respectively. Finally, constraints 
(5-27) and (5-28) represent the binary restoration variables for node ∈  and link 
( , ) ∈  in network ∈  at time ∈ , respectively.  
≥ 0, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-20) 
≥ 0, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-21) 
≥ 0, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-22) 
0 ≤ ≤ 1, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-23) 
0 ≤ ≤ 1, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-24) 
∈ {0} ∪ ℤ , ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-25) 
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∈ {0} ∪ ℤ , ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-26) 
∈ {0,1}, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-27) 
∈ {0,1}, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-28) 
4.5 Numerical Experiment 
In this section, the proposed optimization model to solve the INRP is illustrated 
through a realistic, well-known case in the literature, system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks in Shelby County, TN, in the United States. This county, which 
contains the city of Memphis, is constantly under earthquake hazard due to its proximity 
to the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Hence, in this example, we study the restoration 
strategies of such system considering the impact on it by multiple hypothetical 
earthquakes. 
4.5.1 Networks Data 
The system of networks considered in this study consists of two interdependent 
infrastructure networks in Shelby County, TN: water and power, see Figure 5-1. The 
topologies used were adapted from González et al. [2016] and Hernandez-Fajardo and 
Dueñas-Osorio [2011]. In particular, there are 256 network components that form this 
system of interdependent infrastructure networks (i.e., 109 nodes and 147 links). The 
water network is composed of 49 nodes and 71 links, while the power network is 










Figure 5-1. Graphical representations of the, (a) power, (b) water, and (c) 
interdependent water and power networks in Shelby County, TN (adapted from 
González et al. [2016]) 
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4.5.2 Experimental Results 
This work explores the four different magnitudes for hypothetical earthquake 
scenarios in Shelby County, TN presented by González et al. [2016], ∈ {6,7,8,9}, 
considering the different failure probabilities of each component (node or link) in the 
system of interdependent infrastructure networks with each hypothetical earthquake 
scenario. Accordingly, the average number of the disrupted network components, as 
well as their percentage of the total number of components for the system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks, for each hypothetical earthquake scenario, 
considering a large number of disaster realizations for each magnitude, are shown in 
Table 5-4.  
Table 5-4. Disruption size with hypothetical earthquake scenarios of different 
magnitudes 
 
Magnitude ∪ ′ Disruption percentage 
6 13 5.08% 
7 31 12.11% 
8 58 22.66% 
9 90 31.16% 
 
In this work, the demands at node ∈  in network ∈  is assumed 
proportional to the population surrounding it [González et al. 2016]. Also, the unitary 
flow cost and fixed restoration cost for link ( , ) ∈  and ( , ) ∈ , respectively, are 
assumed proportional to their lengths. Moreover, the cost of unmet demand (i.e., 
disruption cost) in node ∈  is considered to be greater than the maximum feasible 
total flow and restoration costs to set the priorities for the restoration strategy of the 
proposed model (i.e., satisfying the unmet demand first). In addition, the number of 
97 
units in each of the network components is considered to be equal 1, (i.e., ,  =1). 
That is, a disrupted network component will not be operational unless it is fully 
restored. It is assumed that = 1/| |, = 18, = 6, and , ∼ (0,1). 
Naturally, the chosen values of the parameters considered in this work could easily 
accommodate other assumptions to reflect more realistic operating and accounting 
scenarios. The proposed optimization model was solved using Python 2.7 with Gurobi 
7.5. Accordingly, Figure 5-2 illustrates the improvement of the interdependent network 
resilience measure throughout the restoration process for the four different scenarios 
from Table 5-4.  
 
Figure 5-2. Network resilience with hypothetical earthquake scenarios of different 
magnitudes 
 
As stated earlier in Section 5.1, the proposed optimization model for solving the 
INRP focuses on enhancing the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks 
to regain their performance level prior to the disruption. Hence, the disrupted networks 
components might: (i) not all be restored, especially if they do not influence the 
resilience of the other networks, or (ii) restored partially, if they could be functioning 
partially. This point is illustrated in Figure 5-3 for the example of the system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks in Shelby County, TN, with one of the disaster 
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realizations for each of the different magnitudes of hypothetical earthquake scenarios, 
∈ {6,7,8,9}. Figure 5-3 shows: (i) the cumulative number of restored components 
over the restoration time horizon, and (ii) the percentage of the number of restored 
components to the number of disrupted components, shown in Table 4. Observed from 
Figure 5-3 is that not all the disrupted components are restored for the system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks (i.e., 4 components are restored (40.0%) with 
 = 6, 19 components are restored (70.4%) with  = 7, 36 components are restored 





Figure 5-3. Restored network components over time in terms of (a) magnitude 




4.6 Exploring Different Recovery Considerations 
As shown in Section 5.2, the proposed optimization model for solving the INRP 
takes into account some assumptions and considerations related to the assignment of 
work crews and the functionality of network components. However, this section offers 
some extensions, considerations, and strategies to those assumptions and considerations, 
that could be incorporated in the proposed optimization model.  
4.6.1 Recovery Acceleration 
In the proposed optimization model, it is assumed that only a single work crew 
can work on restoring a disrupted component at time ∈ . However, since some 
network components could be critical and have high influence on their performance (or 
the performance of other networks), having multiple work crews working on restoring 
them at the same time could help in expediting the restoration process for the 
components themselves as well as their networks. In addition, the number of work 
crews that can work at the same time could differ from one time to another according to 
the criticality and the need as determined by decision makers. Hence, to allow for such 
consideration, constraints (5-9) and (5-10) are replaced by constraints (5-29) and (5-30), 
respectively, where  is the maximum number of work crews allowed to work at the 
same time on node ∈  in network ∈  at ∈ . Similarly,  is the maximum 
number of work crews allowed to work at the same time on link ( , ) ∈  in network 
∈  at ∈ . 
≤
∈





, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈    
(5-30) 
Figure 5-4 shows the trajectory of the resilience of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks with the recovery progress considering two scenarios where (i) 
a single work crew, “one WC”, and (ii) multiple work crews, “multiple WCs”, can work 
on node ∈  or link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  at time ∈ . For illustrative 
purposes, each disrupted network component is assumed to have the option of having 
any number of the available work crews to work on its restoration at the same time at 
any time, that is   and  are equal to the number of the available work crews in 
network ∈  (i.e., , = ). Moreover, four different magnitudes for hypothetical 
earthquake scenarios are considered (i.e., ∈ {6,7,8,9}) see Figure 5-4.  
          (a)            (b) 
          (c)            (d) 
Figure 5-4. Network resilience considering different work crew scenarios with 
hypothetical earthquake scenarios of magnitude (a) Mw= 6, (b) Mw = 7, (c) Mw = 8, 
and (d) Mw = 9 
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As it can be observed from Figure 5-4, the difference in the resilience measure 
of the interdependent infrastructure networks between the two work crew assignment 
strategies reduces as the disruption is larger. Hence, though assigning multiple work 
crews to the same disrupted network component could aid in faster recovery, there are 
more critical network components that need to be restored to achieve a higher level of 
resilience. Therefore, different work crews are assigned to different disrupted network 
components, not the same component. 
4.6.2 Network Components Functionality 
Recall that and  represent the number of units in node ∈  and link 
( , ) ∈  in network ∈ , respectively. Such numbers of units could be one or 
multiple depending on the nature of the network and the functionality of its 
components. Accordingly, the number of unit in a network component could be one if 
the network component cannot be operational until it is completely restored. On the 
other hand, there could be multiple units in a network component if the component can 
be functioning partially following a disrupted event if it is not completely disrupted or 
after a partial recovery. While the initial illustration in Figure 5-2 assumed that the 
number of units in each component was 1, it could be assumed that , ∼ (1,4) 
such that they could be functioning partially when they are partially disrupted or 
partially recovered. Although the values of these parameters (i.e., for  and ) are 
considered for illustrative purpose, other assumptions could be captured by the 
proposed model to reflect a more realistic network scenario. Figure 5-5 shows the 
improvement in the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks with the 
recovery progress considering two assumptions: (i) , = 1, “one unit”, and (ii) 
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, ∼ (1,4), “multiple units”, for node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈
, respectively.  
          (a)            (b) 
          (c)            (d) 
Figure 5-5. Network resilience considering different recovery assumptions with 
hypothetical earthquake scenarios of magnitude (a) Mw= 6, (b) Mw = 7, (c) Mw = 8, 
and (d) Mw = 9 
 
As shown in Figure 5-5, considering partial functioning of the disrupted 
networks components results in a better level of resilience for the of the system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks through the recovery time horizon. However, the 
two different assumptions reach to the level of having a fully resilient system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks at the same time. It should be noted that the 
notion of a “units” is a function of the type of network not a recovery strategy, and that 
the illustration in Figure 5-5 may not be appropriate for actual water and electric power 
networks. 
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4.6.3 Recovery Task Assignment 
The proposed optimization model for solving the INRP assures that only one 
work crew is working to restore node ∈  or link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  at 
time ∈ . However, there could be different work crews working on the same network 
component at different time periods, especially when the restoration rate and cost are 
specific to the work crew. To illustrate this idea, we consider work crew-based 
restoration costs and rates shown in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-5. Modified restoration parameters for work crew r ∈ Rk in network k ∈ K 
 
 Fixed restoration cost for node ∈  at time ∈  
ℎ  Fixed restoration cost for link ( , ) ∈  at time ∈  
 Restoration rate of node ∈  at time ∈  
 Restoration rate of link ( , ) ∈  at time ∈  
 
To assign restoration tasks of a network component that requires multiple time 
periods for its restoration to the same work crew, new assignment variables must be 
added. These decision variables are used to assign the recovery tasks of node ∈  or 
link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  to the available work crews. Hence,  is a binary 
variable that equals 1 if node ∈  in network ∈  is assigned to work crew ∈
; and 0 otherwise. Similarly,  is a binary variable that equals 1 if link ( , ) ∈  
in network ∈  is assigned to work crew ∈ ; and 0 otherwise. As such, 
constraints (5-31) – (5-34) are added to the proposed model. 
≤ , ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (5-31) 








      ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈  
(5-34) 
Though only a single work crew can work on node ∈  or link ( , ) ∈  in 
network ∈  at time ∈  (i.e., the original assumption of the proposed optimization 
model), two strategies are considered for the work crew assignment: (i) the same work 
crew works on the same disrupted network component at any time (referred to as “same 
WC”), and (ii) different work crews could work on the same disrupted network 
component at different time periods (or “different WCs”). Figure 5-6 illustrates the 
improvement in the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks with the 
recovery progress for these two strategies considering , ∼ (0,1). The resilience 
measure for the system of interdependent infrastructure networks is very similar for 
both strategies, as shown in Figure 5-6, and that is due to the number of units being 
equal to 1 (i.e., ,  =1). That is, a disrupted network component will not be 
operational unless it is fully restored. However, since we are considering different 
restoration rates for different work crews, which result in different restoration cost for 
the disrupted network components accordingly, the restoration cost for both strategies 
are compared. Hence, Figure 5-7 shows the restoration cost for both strategies, 
normalized by the lowest restoration cost (i.e., considering the original assumption, 
different work crews, of the proposed optimization model), where the steady state of the 
cost indicates that the system of interdependent infrastructure networks has reached the 
maximum level of resilience (i.e., Я = 1 for the example). Considering different work 
crews to restore a network component at different time periods could result in a lower 
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restoration cost due to the different recovery rates of the available work crews, as 
shown in Figure 10. The difference in the restoration cost between the two strategies for 
work crew assignment reduces as the disruption worsens, which is due to the size of the 
disruption (i.e., number of disrupted network components) and the number of available 
work crews during the recovery process. 
          (a)            (b) 
          (c)            (d) 
Figure 5-6. Network resilience considering different work crew assignment 
strategies with hypothetical earthquake scenarios of magnitude (a) Mw= 6, (b) Mw = 
7, (c) Mw = 8, and (d) Mw = 9 
 
In general, the variation in the improvement of the interdependent network 
resilience measure depends on: (i) the status (i.e., disruption size) of the disrupted 
networks components as well as their networks, (ii) the nature of the interdependency 
among the infrastructure networks, (iii) the number of available work crews for each 
infrastructure network, and (iv) and variation in the restoration rates for the work crews; 
hence the variation in restoration costs of the disrupted networks components. 
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       (a)         (b) 
       (c)         (d) 
Figure 5-7. Normalized restoration cost considering different work crew 
assignment strategies with hypothetical earthquake scenarios of magnitude (a) 
Mw= 6, (b) Mw = 7, (c) Mw = 8, and (d) Mw = 9 
 
4.6.4 Recovery Process 
There are two different cases for the recovery process of the disrupted network 
component regarding the work crews: (i) preemptive recovery, and (ii) non-preemptive 
recovery. The proposed optimization model for solving the INRP considers the 
preemptive recovery process, where a work crew can move from one disrupted 
component to another in different time periods without having achieved full restoration 
of the previous disrupted component (e.g., a work crew can work on the restoration of 
node ∈  in network ∈  at time ∈  and then work on the restoration of node 
∈  in network ∈  at time + 1 ∈ ). However, for a non-preemptive recovery 
process, a work crew is not allowed to move from a disrupted component to another 
unless they complete the restoration of the previous one. To consider a non-preemptive 
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recovery process with the assumption that the disrupted network components need to 
reach a desired level of functionality, new parameters are added to represent the 
recovery durations of the disrupted components to reach a desired level of recovery. 
Hence,  is the recovery duration for node ∈  in network ∈  (i.e., =
( − )/ ) where ∈ [0,1] is the desired level of functionality for node ∈
 in network ∈  (i.e., ≥ ). Likewise,  is the recovery duration for link 
( , ) ∈  in network ∈  (i.e., = ( − )/ ) where ∈ [0,1] is the 
desired level of functionality for link ( , ) ∈  in network ∈  (i.e., ≥ ). 
Since the proposed optimization model is dealing with time periods for the restoration 
duration of the disrupted components, the recovery durations for the disrupted nodes 
and links (i.e.,  and , respectively) are rounded up to the nearest integer value. 
Moreover, constraint (5-8) is replaced by constraint (5-35) with the consideration of the 





 { , }
( , )∈
≤ 1,
∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  
(5-35) 
Similar to the result in Section 5.3, the interdependent network resilience 
measure is very similar for the two different recovery process assumptions due to the 
number of units being equal to 1 (i.e., ,  =1). Figure 5-8 shows the restoration cost 
considering the two different cases for the recovery process (preemptive and non-
preemptive recovery processes) normalized by the restoration cost resulting from the 
original preemptive assumption. Hence, considering a preemptive recovery assumption 
108 
during the recovery process could lead to a lower restoration cost over time, as shown in 
Figure 5-8. Moreover, the difference in the restoration cost of the two assumptions by 
the work crew is small as each of the disrupted network components in this example has 
one unit only (i.e., a disrupted network component cannot be operational unless it is 
completely restored).  
       (a)         (b) 
       (c)         (d) 
Figure 5-8. Normalized restoration cost considering different assumptions for the 
recovery process with hypothetical earthquake scenarios of magnitude (a) Mw= 6, 
(b) Mw = 7, (c) Mw = 8, and (d) Mw = 9 
 
On the other hand, when the disrupted network components have multiple units 
each (i.e., they can be functioning partially), the difference in the restoration cost could 
be substantial. In addition, the resilience measure for the system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks could be different when considering preemptive and non-
preemptive assumptions since the disrupted network components could be functioning 
partially or have some partial recovery.    
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Chapter 6 : Restoring Community Structures in Interdependent 
Networks 
6.1 Introduction 
Community structures exist in many critical infrastructure networks (e.g., 
electric power, water distribution, transportation), where each network is partitioned 
into sets of densely connected components with sparse connections between them. Such 
community structures are formed in infrastructure networks based on physical 
connections within each network or their spatial characteristics, among others. In this 
chapter, we address the restoration problem of community structures in interdependent 
infrastructure networks following a disruption to enhance their resilience considering 
the interdependencies among the infrastructure networks. 
Several approaches are provided in the literature to identify community 
structures in networks [Fortunato 2010]. In this work, we consider the Fast Modularity 
algorithm proposed by Clauset et al. [2004], which is available in the igraph library in 
the R coding platform. 
6.2 Community Structures Restoration Model 
We extend the proposed restoration model, discussed in Section 4.2, to account 
for the community structures of interdependent infrastructure networks. However, the 
new model (i.e., community structure restoration model, CSRM) deals with a single 
objective of maximizing the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks.  
6.2.1 Assumptions 
There are several assumptions and considerations for the proposed community 
structure restoration model: 
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 Each infrastructure network consists of a set of community structures, which could 
be of different sizes, identified according to the Fast Modularity algorithm. 
 Each community structure in each infrastructure network consists of a set of 
components (nodes and links) that are subjected to be completely disrupted. 
 Community structures within an infrastructure network are connected through 
different number of inter-community links, with known capacities, which are 
subjected to be completely disrupted. 
 Each disrupted component in each infrastructure network can be restored with 
different restoration durations (i.e., recovery durations are not fixed for all disrupted 
components). 
 Each disrupted component in each infrastructure network cannot be operational until 
it is completely restored (i.e., this model does not consider partial functioning). 
 A single work crew can work on restoring a single disrupted network component at 
a time, where they cannot leave the disrupted component until it is completely 
restored (i.e., this model considers a non-preemptive recovery process) 
 Each supply node, demand node, and link in community structure in each 
infrastructure network has a known supply capacity, demand, and flow capacity, 
respectively. 
 The flow costs through each link, unmet demand penalties, and restoration costs for 
disrupted components in community structure in each infrastructure network are 
known and fixed. 
 The physical interdependence among different infrastructure networks is 
considered. That is, for a node in a community structure in an infrastructure network 
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to be operational, it requires a specific node in a community structure in another 
infrastructure network to also be operational. 
 The number of available work crews for each infrastructure network (i.e., 
infrastructure-specific resources) for the restoration of its disrupted components is 
known and could be different from one infrastructure network to another. 
6.2.2 Notation 
The sets, parameters, and decision variables of the proposed optimization model 
to solve the INRP are shown in Table 6-1, Table 6-2, and Table 6-3, respectively. 
Table 6-1. Sets of the proposed CSRM 
 
 Time periods in the restoration horizon, = {1, … , } 
 Interdependent infrastructure networks,  
 Available resources for network ∈  
 Community structures in network ∈  
 Nodes in community structure ∈  in network ∈  
 Links in community structure ∈  in network ∈  
 Supply nodes in community structure ∈  in network ∈ , ⊆  
 Demand nodes in community structure ∈  in network ∈ , ⊆  
 Disrupted nodes in community structure ∈  in network ∈ , ⊆  
 Disrupted links in community structure ∈  in network ∈ , ⊆  
 
Interdependent nodes (i.e., ( , c, ), ,̅ ̅, ∈ Ψ indicates that node ̅ ∈  
in community structure ̅ ∈  in network ∈  requires node  ∈  in 
community structure ∈  in network ∈  to be operational) 
 
Table 6-2. Parameters of the proposed CSRM for community structure c ∈ Ck in 
network k ∈ K 
 
 Amount of supply and demand at node ∈  and node ∈ , respectively 
 Capacity of link ( , ) ∈  
 Weight, ∑ ∑ = 1∈∈  
 Total slacks at all demand nodes in prior to the disruption 
 Total slacks at all demand nodes in after the disruption 
 Restoration duration of node ∈    
 Restoration duration of link ( , ) ∈   
112 
Table 6-3. Decision variables of the proposed CSRM for community structure c ∈ 
Ck in network k ∈ K at time t ∈ T 
 
 Amount of unmet demand, called slack, at node ∈  
 Amount of flow through link ( , ) ∈  
 A binary variable that equals 1 if node ∈  is operational; and 0 otherwise 
 A binary variable that equals 1 if link ( , ) ∈  is operational; and 0 
otherwise 
 A binary variable that equals 1 if node ∈  is restored by work crew ∈ ; 
and 0 otherwise 
 A binary variable that equals 1 if link ( , ) ∈  is restored by work crew ∈
; and 0 otherwise 
 
6.2.3 Objective 
The resilience of the community structures in a system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks is assumed to be a function of unmet demand (slack), . 
Accordingly, reducing the slacks to a desired level represents a means to measure the 
effectiveness of the restoration process. Hence, the resilience of the system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks, i.e., the objective function of the CSRM, can be 
represented mathematically by Eq. (6-1). 
 max




where  refers to the total original slacks at all demand nodes in network ∈  at 
time  and  refers to the total slacks at all demand nodes in network ∈  at time 
 following a disruptive event, , as shown in Figure 2-1. Also, ( ( ) −
) determines the recovery at node ∈  in community structure ∈  in 
network ∈  at time ∈ . Hence, ∑ ( ) −∈  represents the recovery of 
community structure ∈  in network ∈  at time ∈  and ( − ) 
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represents the total loss in community structure ∈  in network ∈  following a 
disruptive event. 
6.2.4 Constraints 
Several sets of constraints are considered in the proposed restoration model: (i) 
network flow constraints, (ii) restoration constraints, (iii) interdependence constraints, 
(iv) logical link constraints for the network flow with restoration, and (v) constraints 
governing the nature of the decision variables. All sets of constraints are explained and 
formulated in the following sections. 
6.2.4.1 Network Flow Constraints 
 For community structure in each infrastructure network, the flow conservation 
at any (i) supply node, ∈ , (ii) transshipment node, ∈ \{ , }, and (iii) 
demand node, ∈  is represented by constraints (6-2), (6-3), and (6-4), respectively. 
Constraints (6-5) ensure that the flow through link ( , ) ∈  in community structure 
∈  in network ∈  at time ∈  does not exceed its capacity. 
( , )∈





= 0,    ∀ ∈ \ , , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  
(6-3) 
( , )∈
+ = ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  
(6-4) 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-5) 
6.2.4.2 Restoration Constraints 
Work crew ∈  in infrastructure network ∈  can work on the restoration 
of a single disrupted network component, i.e., node ∈  or link ( , ) ∈ , at time 
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∈ , as shown in constraints (6-6). Constraints (6-7) and (6-8) ensure that node ∈
 and link ( , ) ∈ , respectively in community structure ∈  in network ∈
 is operational at time ∈  if it is restored by work crew ∈ . Constraints (6-9) 
and (6-10) ensure that node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈ , respectively in community 
structure ∈  in network ∈  cannot be operational prior to its restoration 
duration. Similarly, work crew ∈  cannot complete the restoration of node ∈  
and link ( , ) ∈  in community structure ∈  in network ∈  prior to its 
restoration duration, as shown in constraints (6-11) and (6-12), respectively. 
+ ≤ 1,
 { , }
∈
 { , }
( , )∈
 




, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-7) 
≤
∈
, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-8) 
= 0,       ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-9) 
= 0,       ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-10) 




= 0,       ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈
∈
 (6-12) 
6.2.4.3 Interdependence Constraints 
The physical interdependence among the community structures of different 
infrastructure networks is captured by constraints (6-13). This set of constraints ensure 
that for a node ̅ ∈  in community structure ̅ ∈  in network ∈  to be 
operational at time ∈ , node  ∈  in community structure ∈  in network ∈
 must be operational at time ∈  as well, where ( , c, ), ,̅ ̅, ∈ Ψ . 
̅ − ≤ 0,     ∀ ( , , ), ,̅ ̅, ∈ , ∈   (6-13) 
6.2.4.4 Logical Link Constraints of Network Flow to Restoration 
The flow through link ( , ) ∈  in community structure ∈  in network 
∈  is determined by the capacity of the link as well as the functionality status of the 
nodes at both ends on that link as shown in constraints (6-14) and (6-15). Furthermore, 
the capacity of link ( , ) ∈  in community structure ∈  in network ∈  is 
determined by functionality status of the link itself which is captured by constraints 
(6-16). 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-14) 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-15) 
− ≤ 0,     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-16) 
6.2.4.5 Constraints on the Nature of Decision Variables 
The amount of unmet demand (slack), , at node ∈  and flow through 
link ( , ) ∈ , , in community structure ∈  in network ∈  must be non-
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negative at time ∈ , as shown in constraints (6-17) and (6-18), respectively. The 
functionality status of node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈  in community structure ∈
 in network ∈  at time ∈  is represented by constraints (6-19) and (6-20), 
respectively. Finally, constraints (6-21) and (6-22) represent the binary restoration 
variables for node ∈  and link ( , ) ∈  in community structure ∈  in 
network ∈  at time ∈ , respectively.  
≥ 0,      ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-17) 
≥ 0, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-18) 
∈ {0,1}, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-19) 
∈ {0,1}, ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-20) 
∈ {0,1},     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-21) 
∈ {0,1},     ∀( , ) ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (6-22) 
6.3 Community Structures Importance Measures 
In this section, we propose and discuss multiple community structures 
importance measures (CSIMs) that could be utilized to prioritize the recovery process of 
community structures in a system of interdependent infrastructure networks according 
to multiple different factors. These CSIMs can be categorized into two groups: (i) prior 
to disruptions CSIMs, that is prioritizing community structures in a system of 
interdependent infrastructure network without considering the effect of a disruptive 
event on them, and (ii) post disruptions CSIMs, which consider the effect of a disruptive 
event on community structures in a system of interdependent infrastructure network 
when prioritizing them for restoration. The two groups of CSIMs are presented in the 
following sections.  
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6.3.1 Prior to disruption CSIMs 
6.3.1.1 Inter-Community Links (ICL) 
The inter-community links CSIM quantifies the importance of a community 
structure based on the number of links between that community structure and other 
community structures within the same infrastructure network. ICL is inspired by Rocco 
and Ramirez-Marques [2011]. The higher value of ICL indicates the more critical the 
community structure is for its network.  
Definition 6.3.1.1. (ICL). The ICL of a community structure ∈  in network ∈ , 
denoted as , is defined in Eq. (6-23), where  is the set of links between 




, ≠ ∅ (6-23) 
6.3.1.2 Interdependency Links (IL) 
The interdependency links CSIM measures the importance of a community 
structure based on the number of interdependency links between that community 
structure and other community structures in other infrastructure networks. IL can be 
defined as the ratio of the number of interdependency links for a community structure 
with other community structures in other infrastructure networks to the total number of 
interdependency links exists for other community structures within the same 
infrastructure networks. The higher value of IL indicates the more critical the 
community structure is for the system of interdependent networks. 
Definition 6.3.1.2. (IL). The IL of a community structure ∈  in network ∈ , 
denoted as , is defined in Eq. (6-24), where  is the set of interdependency links 
between a community structure ∈  in network ∈  and other community 
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6.3.1.3 Interdependency and Inter-Community Links (IICL) 
The interdependency and inter-community links CSIM is simply the sum of the 
normalized scores for each community structure by ICL and IL CSIMs. Hence, the 
higher value of IICL indicates the more critical the community structure is for the 
system of interdependent networks. 
Definition 6.3.1.3. (IICL). The IICL of a community structure ∈  in network ∈
, denoted as , is defined in Eq. (6-25), where  and  are the normalized 
scores for community structure ∈  in network ∈  by ICL and IL, respectively.  
= +  (6-25) 
6.3.1.4 Community Demand (CD) 
The community demand CSIM prioritizes community structures of an 
infrastructure network based on the total amount of demands required by each 
community structure in each network. CD can be defined as the ratio of the demand 
required by a community structure in an infrastructure network to the total demand 
required by all community structures within the same infrastructure network. The higher 
value of CD indicates the more critical the community structure is for its network.  
Definition 6.3.1.4. (CD). The CD of a community structure ∈  in network ∈ , 
denoted as , is defined in Eq. (6-26), where  is the demand units required by 




6.3.1.5 Community Reduction Worth (CRW)  
The community reduction worth CSIM is similar to the ЯRW CIM discussed 
earlier in Section 3.3.2. Hence, CRW can be defined as the ratio of the optimal system 
resilience at recovery time  to the optimal system resilience when disrupted network 
components in a community structure are not recovered at recovery time . As this 
CSIM does not consider an actual disruption size or scenario, we consider a complete 
disruption of the system of interdependent infrastructure networks and obtain the 
priorities of community structures accordingly. The higher value of CRW indicates the 
more critical the community structure is for the system of interdependent networks.  
Definition 6.3.1.5. (CRW). The CRW of a community structure ∈  in network ∈
, denoted as , is defined in Eq. (6-27), where Я( ) is the optimal resilience of the 
interdependent infrastructure networks at time , ∈ = ∪ , and 
Я( | ∑ ∑ = 0∈∈ ) is the optimal resilience of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks at time  when all disrupted network components in community structure ∈
 in network ∈  are not recovered. 
=
Я ( )
Я ( | ∑ ∑ = 0∈∈ )
 (6-27) 
6.3.2 Post disruption CSIMs 
6.3.2.1 Community Slacks (CS) 
The community slacks CSIM prioritizes community structures of a networks 
based on the total number of unmet demand units (i.e., slack) at each community 
structure in each infrastructure network following a disruptive event. CS is defined as 
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the ratio of the slack at a community structure in an infrastructure network to the total 
slack at all community structures within the same infrastructure network. The higher 
value of CS indicates the more critical the community structure is for its network.  
Definition 6.3.2.1. (CS). The CS of a community structure ∈  in network ∈ , 
denoted as , is defined in Eq. (6-28), where  is the unmet demand units (i.e., 
slacks) in community structure ∈  in network ∈ .  
= ∑ ∈
 (6-28) 
6.3.2.2 Post Disruption Reduction Worth (PDRW) 
The post disruption reduction worth CSIM is similar to CRW CSIM with the 
main difference of accounting for the real size and scenario of a disruptive event. The 
higher value of PDRW indicates the more critical the community structure is for the 
system of interdependent networks. 
Definition 6.3.2.2. (PDRW). The PDRW of a community structure ∈  in network 
∈ , denoted as , is defined in Eq. (6-29), where Я( ) is the optimal resilience of 
the interdependent infrastructure networks at time , ∈ = ∪ , and 
Я( | ∑ ∑ = 0∈∈ ) is the optimal resilience of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks at time  when all disrupted network components in community structure ∈
 in network ∈  are not recovered. 
=
Я ( )
Я ( | ∑ ∑ = 0∈∈ )
 (6-29) 
6.3.2.3 Weighted Resilience Improvement (WRI) 
The weighted resilience improvement CSIM ranks the community structures in a 
network according to ratio of their weighted improvement to the resilience of the 
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system of interdependent infrastructure networks when their disrupted components are 
restored. That is, the proportional resilience enhancement by restoring the disrupted 
components in a community structure (i.e., having a fully resilient community structure) 
is divided by the sum of their recovery durations. The higher value of WRI indicates the 
more critical the community structure is for the system of interdependent networks. 
Definition 6.3.2.3. (WRI). The WRI of a community structure ∈  in network ∈
, denoted as , is defined in Eq. (6-30), where Я ∑ ∑ = 1∈∈  is the 
optimal resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks at time  when 
disrupted components in community structure ∈  only are restored, ∈ =
∪ , and Я(0) is the resilience of the interdependent networks after the 
disruption at time 0 (i.e., when all disrupted network components are not restored)  
=
Я ∑ ∑ = 1∈∈ − Я (0)
∑ ∈
 (6-30) 
6.4 Numerical Experiment 
6.4.1 Networks Data 
We illustrate our proposed restoration model with fictional interdependent 
infrastructure networks (i.e., power and water), which are generated using R platform as 
described earlier in Section 3.4.1. Accordingly, the two interdependent infrastructure 
networks are generated as illustrated in Figure 6-1. The general properties for each 
network are shown in Table 6-4. 
 
Table 6-4. General properties of the interdependent infrastructure networks 
 
Network     〈 〉 
Power 60 76 17 24 2.53 




Figure 6-1. An example of interdependent infrastructure networks 
  
Figure 6-2 shows the community structures in the system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks identifies by the Fast Modularity algorithm using the igraph 
library in the R platform. Accordingly, there are 8 community structures in power 
network and 7 community structures in water network.  
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 6-2. Community structures in (a) power network, and (b) water network 
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The supply and demand in each community structure in power and water 
networks are shown in Figure 6-3. In some community structures, the supply is more 
than the demand such as community structures 6 and 8 in power network and 
community structures 2 and 3 in water network, see Figure 6-3. Such community 
structures could be less affected by a disruptive event than others. On the other hand, 
the demand in some community structures is more than their supply such as community 
structures 2 and 5 in power network and community structures 1 and 4 in water 
network, see Figure 6-3. Hence, such communities could be more affected by affected 





Figure 6-3. Supply and demand in each community structure in (a) power 
network, and (b) water network 
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6.4.2 Experimental Results 
For illustrative purposes, we consider a spatial disruption scenario with three 
different disruption sizes (i.e., disrupted network components): 10%, 20%, and 30% of 
the total number of components (nodes and links) in the system if interdependent in 
restructure networks. Consequently, the unmet demand after disruption in each 





Figure 6-4. Unmet demand after disruption in each community structure in (a) 
power network, and (b) water network 
 
As it can be observed from Figure 6-4, some community structures were not 
affected by any considered disruption scenario though there are in different sizes such 
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as community structures 3 and 4 in power network and community structures 4 and 7 in 
water network, see Figure 6-4. This could be due to their location since we are 
considering spatial disruption scenario; hence they might be far from the disruption 
location. On the other hand, some community structures were having the same affect 
after disruptions regardless of their sizes such as community structures 2 in power 
network and community structures 2, 3, and 5 in water network, as shown in Figure 6-4. 
Other community structures were affected differently after different disruptions due to 
their different sizes, as illustrated in Figure 6-4. 
6.4.2.1 CSRM 
As for CSRM, Figure 6-5(a), (b), and (c) show the trajectory of resilience 
improvement, obtained when apply CSRM using Python 2.7 with Gurobi 7.5, for both 
power and water networks and the system of interdependent infrastructure networks 
considering different sizes of spatial disruptions, i.e., 10% spatial disruption, 20% 
spatial disruption, and 30% spatial disruption, respectively, with the availability of six 
work crews. As expected, as the disruption size increases, the time to reach to fully 
resilient system of interdependent infrastructure network increases, see Figure 6-5. In 
some cases, the power network reaches to a fully resilient network status before the 
water network, as shown in Figure 6-5 (a) and (b) considering 10% and 20% spatial 
disruption sizes. However, when considering 30% spatial disruption size, the water 
network to a fully resilient network status before the power network which could be 
resulted due to two factors: (i) the interdependency between both networks, and (ii) the 
recovery durations of the disrupted components in both networks, given the same 








Figure 6-5. Network resilience considering (a) 10%, (b) 20%, and (c) 30%, spatial 
disruption 
 
To observe the effect of a disruptive event on each community structure in each 
network and how long does it take to be a fully resilient community structure, we 
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consider a complete disruption of the whole system of interdependent network (i.e., 
100% disruption). Accordingly, the trajectory of the resilience of each community 
structure in both power and water network is illustrated in Figure 6-6, where community 
structure 1 is represented by “C1”, and community structure 2 is represented by “C2”, 





Figure 6-6. Resilience of community structures in (a) power network, and (b) 
water network, considering 100% network disruption 
 
As shown in Figure 6-6, some community structures reach the status of being 
fully resilient earlier than other such as community structure 6 in power network and 
community structure 6 in water network. On the other hand, some community structure 
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longer time than others to be fully resilient such as community structure 5 in power 
network and community structure 7 in water networks. Hence, there are three factors 
that could affect the trajectory of the resilience improvement for a community structure: 
(i) the size of the community structure (i.e., number of components in the community 
structure), as community structures might be in different sizes as shown earlier in 
Figure 6-2, (ii) the interdependency between community structures (i.e., within a single 
network or from different networks), and (iii) the recovery durations of the disrupted 
components in the community structure. 
6.4.2.2 CSIMs 
The restoration priorities for all community structures in the generated system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks were obtained by the multiple prior to and post 
disruptions CSIMs discussed earlier in Section 6.3. Accordingly, Figure 6-7, Figure 6-8, 
and Figure 6-9 show the restoration priorities by multiple CSIMs for community 
structures in both power and water networks considering different spatial disruption 
sizes (i.e., 10%, 20%, and 30%, respectively). 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 6-7. Restoration priorities of community structures in (a) power network, 





Figure 6-8. Restoration priorities of community structures in (a) power network, 





Figure 6-9. Restoration priorities of community structures in (a) power network, 
and (b) water network by multiple CSIMs considering 30% spatial disruption 
 
For each prior to disruption CSIM, the priorities of the community structures in 
the system of the interdependent infrastructure networks are the same regardless of the 
disruption size or scenario as they are not accounted for, see Figure 6-7, Figure 6-8, and 
Figure 6-9. However, when prioritizing community structures in the system of the 
interdependent infrastructure networks with post disruption CSIMs, their restoration 
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priorities could be different as such CSIMs account for the disruption affects, as shown 
in Figure 6-7, Figure 6-8, and Figure 6-9. For example, community structure 8 in power 
network was ranked 8th (i.e., the least important community structure) by WRI when 
considering 10% spatial disruption, see Figure 6-7(a). However, it was ranked 1st (i.e., 
the most important community structure) and 4th by the same CSIM when considering 
20% spatial disruption and 30% spatial disruption, respectively, see Figure 6-8(a) and 
Figure 6-9(a). Similarly, community structure 3 in water network was ranked 5th by 
PDRW when considering 10% spatial disruption, see Figure 6-7(b).  On the other hand, 
it was ranked 2nd and 1st when considering 20% spatial disruption and 30% spatial 
disruption, respectively, see Figure 6-8(b) and Figure 6-9(b). 
As a solution approach to the CSRM, we consider restoring community 
structures according to their priorities obtained by the multiple, prior to disruption and 
post disruption, CSIMs discussed earlier in Section 6.3. Accordingly, the most 
important community structure by a CSIM in each network in the system of the 
interdependent infrastructure networks is restored first, then the second most important 
community structure by the same CSIM is restored second, and the recovery process 
continues until all the community structures are restored according to their priorities. 
That is, the recovery process does not start in a community structure until the demands 
of all community structures with higher importance, considering the same CSIM, are 
satisfied. Hence, Figure 6-10 shows the trajectory of the resilience of the system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks when restoring community structures in each 
network according to their priorities by multiple CSIMs considering different spatial 








Figure 6-10. Network resilience considering community structures priorities by 
multiple CSIMs with (a) 10%, (b) 20%, and (c) 30%, spatial disruption 
 
Another approach of utilizing the priorities of community structures obtained by 
the multiple CSIMs discussed earlier is that considering these priorities as the weights 
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of community structures in Eq. (6-1), instead of assuming equal weights for all 
community structures in each network, and solve the CSRM accordingly. Hence, Figure 
6-11 shows the trajectory of the resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure 
networks considering different weights for community structures in each network based 
on their priorities obtained by multiple CSIMs with 30% spatial disruption scenario. 
That is, the disrupted components in different community structures were restored 
according to the importance of their community structures by different CSIMs. 
Accordingly, the trajectory of the resilience considering different restoration priorities 
by different CSIMs was compared using a common resilience measure, Eq. (4-1), 
considering equal weights for each network. Hence, considering different weights for 
community structures results in different trajectory of resilience enhancement of the 
system of interdependent networks than when assuming equal weights for them, as 
shown in Figure 6-11, which could be considered by decision makers. In addition, since 
different CSIMs measure the importance from different perspectives, priorities obtained 
by them could be combined using a multi-criteria decision-making tool such as TOPSIS 
[Almoghathawi et al. 2017a] to have a unique rank for the community structures. 
 
Figure 6-11. Network resilience considering priorities by CSIMs as weights with 
30% spatial disruption  
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Chapter 7 : Conclusion 
In this chapter, we summarize the contributions of the work in this dissertation 
and present some recommendations for future work. 
7.1 Concluding Remarks 
Critical infrastructure networks are the backbone of modern societies, providing 
the fundamental services that support their continuous operation. However, the 
ubiquitous nature of such infrastructure networks has made them highly vulnerable due 
to the different types of interdependencies among them. Moreover, the proliferation of 
interdependencies among infrastructure networks has increased the complexity 
associated with recovery planning after a disruptive event, which becomes a more 
challenging task for decision makers.  
Recognizing the inevitability of large-scale disruptions and their impacts to 
societies, the research objective of this work is to study the recovery of systems of 
interdependent infrastructure networks following a disruptive event. Accordingly, the 
main contribution in this dissertation is developing: (i) importance measures, and (ii) 
restoration modeling approaches, that enhance the resilience of a system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks considering the physical interdependency among 
the infrastructure networks. Though the work in this dissertation discusses systems of 
interdependent infrastructure networks, the developed importance measures and 
restoration modelling approaches in this dissertation could be applied to any set of 
physically interdependent networks.     
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7.1.1 Component Importance Measures 
The goal of the importance measures is to identify the critical network 
components that influence not only (i) the performance of their networks the most when 
disrupted and restored, but also (ii) the performance of other networks due to their 
interdependent nature. Hence, we propose two component importance measures 
(CIMs), to prioritize the disrupted components of interdependent infrastructure 
networks based on multiple interdependent networks resilience optimization models 
using mixed-integer programming (MIP) with the objective of enhancing their 
resilience considering their interdependences. The purpose of the two proposed CIMs is 
to (i) quantify the effect of the disrupted components on the resilience of the 
interdependent infrastructure networks once they are recovered, and (ii) measure the 
potential impact on the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks caused 
by a specific disrupted network element, respectively, and prioritize the set of disrupted 
components accordingly. Multiple factors could affect the rank of the disrupted 
networks components: (i) the nature of the disruptive event, (ii) the set of disrupted 
components, and (iii) the interdependency between infrastructure networks. 
The proposed CIMs represent a useful tool that can help decision makers to 
identify critical components in their networks following a disruptive event according to 
their impact on resilience of the system of interdependent network. Hence, managerial 
decisions guided by this exercise could involve the preplacement of restoration 
resources near important components, or perhaps investments in hardening or 
redundancy to reduce the vulnerability of those components prior to a disruption. 
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7.1.2 Restoration Models 
We study the interdependent network restoration problem (INRP), which seeks 
to find the minimum-cost restoration strategy of a system of interdependent networks 
following the occurrence of a disruptive event that enhances its resilience considering 
the availability of time and resources. Accordingly, we propose optimization models 
using MIP to solve this problem and suggest some solution approaches for large scale 
disruptions. In particular, the proposed model: (i) prioritizes the restoration of the 
disrupted components for each infrastructure network, and (ii) assigns and schedule the 
prioritized networks components to the available work crews, such that the resilience of 
the system of interdependent infrastructure networks is enhanced considering the 
physical interdependency among them. The proposed optimization models for solving 
the INRP consider partial and complete: (i) disruptions for the disrupted network 
components, (ii) recovery of the disrupted network components, and (iii) dependence 
between nodes in different networks. Furthermore, four different recovery strategies 
considering different assumptions regarding work crew assignment and recovery 
process have been explored. These strategies include: (i) recovery acceleration (i.e., 
assigning more than one work crew to restore the same disrupted component at the 
same time), (ii) network component functionality (i.e., recovering a disrupted 
component partially), (iii) recovery tasks assignment (i.e., assigning the same work 
crew to recover a disrupted component at any time), and (iv) recovery process (i.e., 
considering a preemptive or non-preemptive recovery process). 
Since the proposed optimization models focuses on enhancing the resilience of 
the system of interdependent networks to retain their performance level prior to the 
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disruption, not all the disrupted networks components might be restored. In addition, 
several factors could affect the progress of improvement for the resilience of the system 
of interdependent infrastructure networks and the total cost associated with the recovery 
process: (i) the disruption size, (i.e., number of disrupted components in each 
infrastructure network), (ii) the nature of the interdependencies among the infrastructure 
networks, and (iii) the available work crews for each infrastructure network during the 
restoration process (i.e., the number of available work crews, the restoration rate of each 
work crew). Furthermore, the available time and budget for the restoration process can 
decide the maximum level of resilience that the system of interdependent infrastructure 
networks can reach.  
7.1.3 Restoring Community Structures 
We address the restoration problem of community structures in a system of 
interdependent infrastructure networks following a disruptive event to enhance their 
resilience considering the interdependencies among the infrastructure networks. We 
propose a restoration model using MIP to restore community structures of 
interdependent infrastructure networks with the objective of maximizing the resilience 
of the system interdependent infrastructure networks. We also, propose some 
community structures importance measures (CSIMs) to priorities their restoration 
process. The proposed CSIM are categorized into two groups: (i) prior to disruption 
CSIMs, and (ii) post disruption CSIMs. Such measures could be used in solving the 
restoration model of community structures either as weights for the community 
structure in the objective function or solving the model by restoring community 
structures according to their importance. 
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7.2 Future Research 
Multiple recommendations for possible extensions to the work of this 
dissertation are presented in the coming sections.  
7.2.1 Component Importance Measures 
The two proposed CIMs consider only the physical interdependency between 
infrastructure networks, which could be extended to incorporate other interdependencies 
such as geographical interdependency. Furthermore, the proposed CIMs could be 
extended to incorporate the parameters uncertainty such as recovery duration, disruption 
size, supply, demand, available number of work crews, among others. Also, another 
extension could be considering the restoration up to a specific desired level of 
performance or resilience, supplies and demands that are a function of time, and other 
adaptive capacity measures that could assist in meeting demand (e.g., alternate supply 
units). 
7.2.2 Restoration Models 
Studying the vulnerability of the components in each infrastructure network 
could help in identifying the critical ones to reinforce or protect prior to any disruption, 
thus potentially leading a shorter time to achieve full resilience as well as a lower cost 
associated with the restoration process. Therefore, a tradeoff between the vulnerability 
and restoration of the interdependent infrastructure networks could be studied to find 
the optimal strategy for investment. Moreover, the proposed models could be extended 
to consider the location of facilities from which work crews dispatch to the locations of 
their assigned disrupted networks components. Hence, accounting for the movement of 
the available work crews within the networks. That is, finding the optimal location of 
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these facilities from a set of candidate sites considering the cost of establishing such 
facilities along with the travel distance and cost for the work crews. Also, the model 
could be extended to account for the accessibility of the roads. In addition, the proposed 
models consider only the physical interdependency among infrastructure networks. 
However, other types of interdependency could be considered such as geographical 
interdependency. Geographical interdependency could be incorporated in the proposed 
model by considering the preparation of spaces that are shared by disrupted components 
from multiple interdependent infrastructure networks prior to the commencement of 
their restoration activities. Furthermore, instead of assigning the same weight for each 
infrastructure network to determine the resilience of the system of interdependent 
networks, a new method could be utilized for trading off one infrastructure network 
versus another and their weights could be adjusted accordingly. Also, the proposed 
model could be extended to incorporate the parameters uncertainty. Finally, the 
proposed models could be extended to quantify objectives related not just to 
infrastructure resilience but also to the resilience of the communities by considering the 
vulnerability of the society that interacts with these infrastructure networks. 
7.2.3 Restoring Community Structures  
In this work, the Fast Modularity algorithm is considered to identify community 
structure in an infrastructure network. However, other methods based on different 
interesting aspects could be used such as identifying community structure based on 
geographical location, social vulnerability index, among others. In addition, other 
interdependencies could be considered instead of the physical one only. Moreover, the 
proposed model could be extended to incorporate the parameters uncertainty. 
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